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ABSTRACT 
We investigate how the evolution of ownership structure affects corporate financial and 
operating performance and corporate strategies. In particular, we study whether the shift in 
control rights away from the dominant shareholder mitigates agency problems and accordingly 
expropriation of minority investors by the controlling shareholder. More specifically, does the 
increase in power of the second large shareholder manifest in the firm’s operating and financial 
performance, and financing and operating strategies? Using ownership data for 1996 and 2008 
representing 403 firms from nine East Asian countries, we find strong and robust evidence that 
the change in the voting rights of the second largest shareholder over these twelve years is 
associated with higher firm valuation, better operating performance, better access to long term 
financing, more efficient operation management strategies and a higher dividend payout ratio. 
Consistent with prior literature that finds multiple large shareholders play an internal governance 
role and mitigate agency problems, our findings imply that an increase in the voting rights of the 
second large shareholder improves firm’s corporate governance and mitigates agency problems 
consequently increasing firm performance and improving strategies.  
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1. Introduction 
A growing body of work has sought to understand the effects of ownership structures on 
corporate governance and agency issues. Literature has documented that firms with bad 
corporate governance have severe agency problems which lead to a lower firm value (Gompers 
et al., 2003; Bebchuck et al., 2009). Majority of studies in ownership structures to date have 
focused on two types of ownership structures: with 100% dispersed ownership (widely-held 
firms) and with a dominant controlling shareholder with a number of small shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Laeven and Levine, 2008). In the first case, dispersed small owners 
have little incentives to monitor as their share in the firm’s cash flows is relatively small 
compared to the cost of private monitoring and little ability to monitor managers because of 
insufficient votes to exert individual influence in the election of directors. Therefore, in the 
dispersed ownership firms the manager has substantial power in firm's decision making process 
and to extract private benefits at the cost of shareholders. This raises the conflicts of interest 
between the manager and dispersed shareholders, which are often refereed as type 1 agency 
problems. In such situations level of expropriation of firms resources by manager largely 
depends on external governance environment, poor investor protection environments 
experiencing greater expropriation of firms resources by managers. Therefore, when external 
governance is weak, literature suggests (e.g. Morck et al., 2005: Burkhart et al., 2003) that this 
inability of dispersed shareholders to monitor managers makes the existence of a controlling 
blocks economically beneficial.  Therefore, the second situation that,, there exists one dominant 
shareholder who holds the control of the firm, where this large shareholder can either run the 
business himself/herself or designate a professional manager, thus internalizing the benefits from 
monitoring the manager (Laeven and Levine, 2008) and creating firm value.. However, the 
existence of the controlling shareholder is a double-edged sword. On one hand, the significant 
cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder gives him/her incentives to monitor the behaviour 
of the manager, mitigate agency problems existed in dispersed ownership corporations, increase 
the likelihood of a takeover (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) and enhance earnings informativeness 
(Boubaker and Sami, 2011), which is consistent with the incentive effect (La Porta el al, 2002; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). On the other hand, the controlling blockholder with significant 
controlling power also gains the power to expropriate minority shareholders, incentives to 
expropriate increase especially when s/he holds voting rights in excess of cash flow rights. The 
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significant control in the hand of the dominant shareholder with limited cash flow rights 
increases the likelihood of extraction of private benefits by the dominant shareholders, 
consequently decreasing firm value and earnings informativeness (Grossman and Hart, 1988; 
Boubaker and Sami, 2011), reducing the credibility of firms' accounting information (Fan and 
Wong, 2002), increasing the cost of capital (Guedhami and Mishra, 2009), reducing the pace of 
innovation (Morck et al., 2005), and impede the initiative of the manager if monitored by the 
controlling shareholder inadequately (Burkart et al., 1997). In summary, this creates type 2 
agency problems involving conflicts of interest between the dominant shareholder and minority 
shareholders, which is consistent with the entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002; Guedhami 
and Mishra, 2009).  
Both types of agency problems have been extensively studied in the literature. However, the 
focus of ownership concentration has been shifted from the conflicts of interest between 
managers and small shareholders in dispersed corporations to the agency problems between the 
dominant shareholder and minority investors in concentrated ownership firms, especially in 
countries where legal institutions are relatively weak (Guedhami and Mishra, 2009; Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005). Indeed, except for a few developed countries like US and UK, the excess control 
is widely reported in the modern literature, especially in Western European and East Asian 
countries with relatively weak investor protection which make the expropriation corporate 
resources more severe. La Porta et al. (2000) find that a strong investor protection makes 
expropriation less efficient, which is beneficial for corporate governance and the ownership 
structure tend to be more dispersed.  
Despite a large body of research on the corporate governance role and firm value  effects of the 
single controlling shareholder, literature largely overlooks the potential role of other large 
shareholders (MLS) in shaping firms’ internal governance environments and potential 
expropriation of the firm’s resources. Yet, Faccio and Lang (2002), Claessens et al. (2000), 
Carney and Child (2012) and La Porta et al. (1999) have shown the popularity of multiple large 
shareholders around the world, especially in East Asian and Western European countries. Recent 
theoretical and empirical studies have found both positive and negative effects of MLS on firm-
level governance. On one hand, MLS with substantial voting powers have the incentives and 
ability to monitor the largest shareholder and therefore can reduce the expropriation of minority 
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shareholders and improve the firm’s governance environment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; 
Pagano and Rӧell, 1998). This literature also suggests that in order to gain more control of the 
firms, MLS compete to win the control contests. Therefore, MLS will support (object) to those 
optimal (poor) investments, which could be beneficial (harmful) to the interests of minority 
shareholders, to gain the voting from them (Bloch and Hege, 2001; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 
2000). Thus, MLS shift the benefits towards minority shareholders, which in turn mitigate 
agency problems. Furthermore, Edmans and Manso (2011) report that even if MLS might be 
subjected to free-rider problems, it improves firm-level governance through a mechanism of 
trading i.e., “voting with their feet”. MLS may trade aggressively on private information, which 
in turn impounds private information into stock price consequently reducing information 
asymmetry. This mechanism disciplines the manager and forces them not to invest in sub-
optimal projects. Moreover, Dhillon and Rossetto (2009) propose that MLS may arise in order to 
gain enough power to influence the voting outcome towards higher risk investments at the 
expense of the loss in diversification. As a consequence, such influence of MLS shifts the 
benefits towards dispersed shareholders and enhances firm value. On the other hand, MLS can 
form a controlling coalition to pursue and share the diverted private benefits (Gomes and 
Novaes, 2001; Zwiebel, 1995; Winton, 1993). These roles of MLS shed some light on corporate 
governance mechanisms, but also add more complexity to the traditional agency conflicts. Given 
the divergence of perspectives on the role of MLS, whether MLS has a positive impact on 
mitigating agency problems and enhancing internal governance is still an empirical question, 
which we test in this paper.  
Following Attig et al. (2009) which finds that the concentrated ownership and the existence of 
MLS in nine East Asian countries
1
 is widespread and these countries are considered to have a 
relatively weak legal institutions and more severe agency conflicts, this thesis focuses on these 
nine countries and investigates if long term shift in voting power away from the dominant 
shareholders measured by the change in voting rights of the second large shareholder, has a 
positive effect on mitigating agency problems and increasing firm value. The thesis also 
                                                          
 
1
Nine East Asian countries include: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand.  
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examines the channels through which this shift in power towards the second largest shareholder 
helps improve firm value.   
 We compile a dataset consisting of 403 firms from nine East Asian countries that have 
ownership data for 1996 in Claessens et al. (2000) and for 2008 in Carney and Child (2008). 
These studies compute ownership and control for up to 5 ultimate large shareholders of the firms. 
Using these ownership datasets we compute the change in voting rights of the dominant 
shareholder and the second large shareholder from 1996 to 2008. We consider an increase 
(decrease) in the voting rights of the second large (dominant) shareholder as the shift in power 
away from the dominant shareholder. In other words, the firms that exhibit increase in voting 
rights of the second large shareholder are considered to have gained power for the second large 
shareholder to contest the power of the dominant shareholder. Using this dataset, we find that the 
change in voting rights of the second large shareholder (shift in power away from the dominant 
shareholder) from 1996 to 2008 has a significantly positive impact on firm valuation (Tobin’s Q) 
and operating performance (ROA and ROE), which suggests that the shift in power towards the 
second large shareholder (away from the dominant shareholder) mitigates agency problems and 
improves firm performance. Furthermore, we investigate possible channels through which MLS 
can play a positive role on firm performance. First, we find that firms featuring an increase in 
power towards the second large shareholder tend to have more long term debt and less short term 
debt, plausibly because MLS mitigate agency problems and improve information quality which 
results in a lower cost of long term financing and improved access to long term finance. Second, 
we note that the firms experiencing increase in the power of second large shareholder feature a 
better operation management. Specifically, an increase of the voting rights of the second large 
shareholder is associated with a decrease in the proportion of inventory in the balance sheet, 
which implies that the shift in power towards the second large shareholder can increase the 
efficiency of operation management, which leads to a better firm performance. Third, we find 
that firms experiencing increase in the voting power of second large shareholder have a higher 
dividends payout ratio, suggesting lack of desire to pile up unproductive cash or potentially build 
empire with shareholders’ money. 
While our desire is to examine how the firms experiencing a long term shift in power towards the 
second largest shareholder perform compared to their counterparts experiencing otherwise, 
because the timing of the measurement of shift in power overlaps the time in which we measure 
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dependent variables, our tests are suspect for endogeneity bias. We address these endogeneity 
biases in two ways. First, we use the dependent variables measured subsequent to 2008, while 
our key test variables are measured over 1996 to 2008 and find that our results remain practically 
the same. Second, we use the industry-country average change in voting rights of the second 
large shareholder as the proxy of the shift in power away from the dominant shareholder and find 
that our results practically remain the same. We believe these tests help alleviate endogeneity 
concern embedded in the selection of the test environment in this study.  
Our empirical results are related to previous literature in the following ways. First, our study is 
related to Maury and Pajuste (2005) as we also find the positive effect of MLS on firm value and 
operating performance. However, this thesis is different from Maury and Pajuste (2005) in that 
we study the effect of the evolution of the power of MLS (in particular shift in power away from 
the dominant shareholder) on firm value and operating performance. Second, our study is related 
to Attig et al. (2008), as we also argue that MLS is associated with a lower financing cost. Our 
study is different from Attig et al. (2008) in that we pay more attention to the effect of MLS on 
firm’s access to long-term debt financing and on evolution of the power of MLS over a decade. 
Third, our paper is consistent with Lin et al. (2013) which suggest that firms with less monitoring 
needs should rely more on public debt which typically have longer maturity than bank debt. 
Given that firms featuring shift in power towards MLS (away from the dominant shareholder) 
have lower agency costs, better internal governance, lower information asymmetry and better 
earnings informativeness, such firms have less monitoring needs thus better access to public debt 
suggesting less reliance on bank debt. Fourth, our paper is related to McNaughton et al. (2001) 
who show inventory as an important channel to attract new customers, shorten sales cycles, and 
increase earnings and profitability, which therefore create value for the owners of the firm. Our 
results demonstrate that an increase in voting power of the second large shareholder is associated 
with a lower inventory, indicating that MLS can enhance firm performance through more 
efficient operation management strategies.  
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents literature review regarding the 
traditional ownership structure, corporate governance mechanisms, and the effect of multiple 
large shareholders on firm value. Section 3 describes the hypotheses developments and related 
literature. Section 4 defines our data construction, methodology, and variable specifications. 
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Section 5 discusses our empirical results. Section 6 and Section 7 presents the robustness tests 
and conclusion.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure 
A large string of traditional corporate finance theory in its ideal form presumes a public company 
with dispersed ownership, where the firm is controlled by the board elected by shareholders with 
ownership of a meaningfully small fraction of the company’s equity capital. For example, Berle 
and Means (1932) document that in many large corporations of US ownership structures are 
mainly dispersed among small shareholders, while firms are managed by professionals who do 
not have much aligned interest with atomistic shareholders. In this type of companies, managers, 
including board of directors act as agents of dispersed shareholders to manage the firm on the 
latter’s behalf, while the latter does not have enough power to monitor the manager's activities. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) document that the benefits of widely held firms are that in firms 
especially those which are large and complex, there is a huge demand for wealth to be invested 
by residual claimants to implement more optimal projects, therefore each residual claimant or 
shareholder is able to hold only a small piece of pie and does not have the ability to control the 
firm and monitor the manager's behaviours. In this situation, it is less costly to delegate the 
control to other professional agents whose managerial skills are not closely tied to firm's risk and 
wealth. Moreover, the diffuse ownership structure lowers the cost of risk-bearing services and 
therefore enhances the adaptability of a complex organization to changes in the economic 
environment (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p.312). Although there are benefits within widely held 
corporations, this form of organization gives raise to conflicts of interests (agency problems) 
between managers and ultimate owners (dispersed shareholders), where ownership is totally 
separated from the control of the firm. Therefore, the manager has the incentives to expropriate 
the benefits of small shareholders and pursues his/her private interests, causing the firm to 
undertake sub-optimal investment projects and reducing firm value, especially when the manager 
holds little equity of the firm (Morck et al., 2005). Empire building is a typical example where 
the manager undertakes less risky projects and pursues more diversifications of the firm so that 
s/he can guarantee his/her long-lasting job. However, such ideal form of public companies is 
limited around the world, including even the developed countries like the U.S. and Canada.  
A large number of public companies around the world feature a dominant shareholder holding 
votes enough to elect a controlling board of directors. Such large shareholder may choose to 
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either run the business himself/herself or hire a professional manager. The controlling 
shareholders may be individuals, families, states, or institutions, which may gain controlling 
stakes either directly or through controlling enhancing mechanisms such as pyramid structures, 
dual class shares, or cross-holdings (Claessens et al., 2002). This form of ownership structures in 
public companies mitigate the first type of agency problems (i.e. between managers and 
shareholders) by alleviating expropriation of a firm’s resources by managers. Demsetz (1983) 
argues that even though there is no separation of ownership and control, the value of owners' 
assets can still be maximized. Specifically, he argues that “it is equally unreasonable to suppose 
that potentially valuable assets will not be controlled effectively by some groups of owners” 
(Demsetz, 1983). Consistent with Demsetz (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1986) illustrate that the 
controlling shareholders can help mitigating free-rider problems existing in widely held 
corporations and increase the likelihood of a takeover (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Their study 
shows that large shareholdings are prevalent in Fortune 500 companies: “354 have at least one 
shareholder owning at least 5 percent of the firm” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, p.462). Similarly, 
Faccio and Lang (2002), by examining 5,232 firms of 13 western European countries, show that 
while nearly 37% of the firms are widely held, 63% are controlled by large shareholders mainly 
through dual-class shares and pyramid structures, especially for non-financial and small firms. 
Claessens et al. (2000) also find similar results by studying nine East Asian markets where most 
of them have relatively weak legal protection of investors. They argue that among 2980 publicly 
traded corporations of East Asia more than two-thirds have single ultimate owners and the 
separation of management and control is not prevalent. Similar findings are cited in Fama and 
Jensen (1983), La Porta et al (1999) and Morck et al. (2005). Typically, the large shareholders 
have incentives and ability to monitor managers. Because the controlling shareholders typically 
have enough cash flow rights in the firm and bear the most loss if the manager is not undertaking 
the optimal investment decisions, providing them incentives to closely monitor managers. This is 
consistent with incentive effect (La Porta el al, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Claessens et al, 
2002), which has positive implications for shareholders’ wealth. In contrast, the controlling 
shareholder can play a negative role (exacerbate agency problems) and reduce firm value, 
especially when the voting right of the controlling shareholder exceeds his/her cash flow rights. 
The excess control of the controlling shareholder may build primarily through three different 
control enhancing mechanisms: pyramid structures, cross-holdings, and dual-class shares. 
9 
 
Boubaker and Sami (2011) argue that the earnings informativeness could decrease when there is 
an excess control of the largest shareholder in a firm, while the earnings informativeness is 
increasing with the existence of multiple large shareholders. Using 402 French publicly traded 
firms from 2003 to 2007, Boubaker and Sami also demonstrate that for France where the 
majority of the firms are controlled by at least one large shareholder, the increase in cash flow 
rights of the ultimate largest shareholder can enhance earnings informativeness, which aligns the 
interests of controlling shareholder with those of the dispersed minority shareholders. Consistent 
with Boubaker and Sami (2011), using 1301 publicly traded firms of eight East Asian markets, 
Claessens et al. (2002) also fully address the incentive and entrenchment effect. Claessens et al. 
(2002) document that when the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder increase, firm value 
(as measured by the market-to-book ratio of assets) increases as well. On the other hand, firm 
value decreases with the excess of voting powers of the largest shareholder, especially when 
there is a weak legal protection for minority shareholders. Other studies also lend support to that 
the separation of control rights and cash flow rights of the largest shareholders can decrease 
shareholder's value, lead to sub-optimal investment decisions (Grossman and Hart, 1988), extract 
private benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), reduce the credibility of firms' accounting 
information (Fan and Wong, 2002), decrease earnings informativeness (Boubaker and Sami, 
2011), implement conservative investment strategies (lower corporate risk taking) (Mishra, 
2011), and increase the cost of capital (Attig et al., 2008).  
The focus of ownership structure literature has recently been shifted from the conflicts of interest 
between managers and small shareholders to the agency problems between the dominant 
shareholder and minority investors, especially in countries where legal institutions are relatively 
weak (Guedhami and Mishra, 2009; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). In a similar vein, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) document that in US and Britain where legal protection is better than other 
countries, the ownership structure of corporations is less concentrated. Countries such as Japan 
and Germany are reliance on both legal protection and large shareholders. But in countries where 
legal protection is relatively weak, such as Continental Europe and other emerging markets, 
firms rely more on large shareholders and a large number of them are family-controlled. Similar 
results are found by Morck et al. (2005). However, literature is still sparse on the ownership 
structures featuring more than one large shareholder (i.e. multiple large shareholders) with 
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significant voting rights to exercise meaningful control of the board. Below we discuss agency 
conflicts in the firms featuring multiple blockholders. 
2.2 Corporate Governance, Firm Value and Multiple Large Shareholders 
Recently, an increasing number of studies have examined complex ownership structures, i.e. an 
ownership structure that has multiple large shareholders each holding significant block besides 
the largest shareholder (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Boubaker and Sami, 
2011; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Claessens et al, 2000; Carney and Child, 2012). 
Faccio and Lang (2002) record that among 13 Western European countries nearly 44% of the 
firms have MLS beyond the largest shareholder. Similar observations are made in Laeven and 
Levine (2008) who demonstrate that about one-third of listed firms in Western Europe have MLS 
and that the firm valuation of firms featuring MLS is different from those of widely-held firms 
and firms controlled by single large shareholder. Boubaker and Sami (2011) show that 44.89% of 
listed French firms feature MLS in their ownership structures. Maury and Pajuste (2005), after 
studying 136 Finnish listed firms, find that 31.7% firm-years have a second blockholder and in 
16.3% firm-years there is a third blockholder. The popularity of MLS can also be found in 
Gutiérrez and Tribó (2004) who study Spanish firms, and Andres (2008) who study German 
listed companies. Apart from European countries, MLS also exist in East Asia and other parts of 
the world. Claessens et al (2000), using a sample of 2980 corporations from nine East Asian 
countries in 1996, including Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, show significant presence of multiple large 
shareholders with some firms featuring up to five large blockholders with voting rights in excess 
of 10%. They find that among 2980 East Asian corporations 31.54% of them have two large 
shareholders with voting rights in excess of 10% and approximately 10% of them have three 
large shareholders. In line with Claessens et al. (2000), Carney and Child (2012) re-examine the 
ownership structures of these same countries with two hundreds largest firms from each country 
in 2008. They show that among 1386 largest publicly traded companies of nine East Asian 
countries at the end of 2008, the proportion of firms controlled by single large shareholder (SLS 
thereafter) increases from 44% to 86%. Also, the proportion of firms featuring more than one 
large shareholder is 17.44%.  
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According to the existing literature, the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on firm 
value is mixed. On one hand, MLS with substantial voting power have the incentives and ability 
to monitor the largest shareholder and therefore can reduce the expropriation of profit from the 
minority shareholders, through which MLS play a value-enhancing role in firms (La Porta et al., 
1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; Pagano and Rӧell, 1998); Also, in order to gain more 
control of the firms, MLS have incentives to compete with each other to win the controlling 
power or more positions on a corporate board. Therefore, MLS will object those conservative or 
poor investments which may harm the benefits of minority shareholders to gain the support from 
them (Bloch and Hege, 2001; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). Pagano and Rӧell (1998) argue 
that when a large initial shareholder needs external funding, s/he faces a trade-off between 
external monitoring and the cost of going public, since the existence of MLS beyond the largest 
shareholder play a monitoring role to reduce the expropriation of the firm's benefits. Gomes and 
Novaes (1999) find that MLS can disapprove some sub-optimal decisions in order to prevent the 
largest shareholder from extracting benefits from minority shareholders. Bloch and Hege (2001) 
show that in a model consisting two large shareholders and a number of small shareholders, both 
of large shareholders try to attract more votes from small shareholders to become the dominant 
shareholder. In order to gain more control of the firms, MLS have incentives to compete with 
each other to win the controlling power or more positions on a corporate board. Therefore, MLS 
will limit or minimize their rent extraction, which may be harmful for the benefits of minority 
shareholders, to gain the support from them. In this way, such an ownership structure can 
minimize rent extraction. In a similar vein, Nenova (2003) analyzes further the effect of a 
competing large blockholder on monitoring the dominant shareholder through the vote-value 
approach. Specifically, she proposes that when a large shareholder competes for control, s/he is 
willing to even give up some of his/her own benefits, to pay to minority vote-owners a positive 
price for their votes up to his expected value of control (Nenova, 2003, p.326), in order to win 
the contest. Similarly, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) study the relationship between 
corporate valuation and the distribution of cash flow rights among shareholders. They find that 
large shareholders would compete to form a control of firms. The coalition internalizes the 
consequences of its actions or expropriates benefits of other shareholders. The model 
demonstrates further that when the cash flow rights are evenly distributed among large 
shareholders, MLS are the most efficient and reduce the chance of forming a coalition with small 
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cash flow rights. Alternatively, Dhillon and Rossetto (2009) suggest an endogenous preference 
for risk level of investments based on investors’ stakes in the firm. While the controlling large 
shareholder tends to invest in less risky projects which are not in line with small shareholders, 
some investors become MLS to gain more influence to shift the voting outcome towards 
dispersed shareholders, yet not holding more shares than the initial shareholders to significantly 
reduce their diversification. This equilibrium of actions leads MLS to vote for the benefits of 
small shareholders, thus in turn enhances firm value. Another research by Edmans and Manso 
(2011) document a situation when MLS fail to monitor the dominant shareholder to avoid value-
destroying investment decisions. They argue that MLS can generate free-rider problems and do 
not have enough power to monitor the manager due to coordination issues. However, they point 
out further that this coordination issues can improve their effectiveness through trading. By 
“voting with their feet” MLS trade aggressively on private information, injecting more 
information into stock price, which allows MLS to discipline the manager and prevent sub-
optimal decisions. Empirically, there are a number of studies which lend support to the positive 
role of MLS in corporate governance. Lehmann and Weigand (2000), Volpin (2002) and Carlin 
and Mayer (2000; 2003) find that MLS are associated with a higher firm value and higher 
risk/return. Using the sample of nine East Asian corporations from Claessens et al. (2000), 
Mishra (2011) investigates ownership structures with single large shareholder and MLS and 
uncovers the relationship between the voting rights of MLS and corporate risk taking (CRT) in 
East Asia. The empirical testing results show that in firms with a dominant shareholder, the 
presence of MLS has a significant and positive effect on CRT, through which MLS can mitigate 
agency problems and affect firm value and this effect is more prominent in firms featuring a 
family as the dominant shareholder. Furthermore, besides the presence of MLS, the voting power 
of the second largest shareholder and more than two multiple large shareholders beyond the 
dominant shareholder is also positively associated with CRT, which is consistent with the 
efficient bargaining effects hypothesis. Maury and Pajuste (2005) discuss different conditions 
under which MLS can be a benefit or harm to minority shareholders or firm value by looking at 
the characteristics and identities of individual blockholders. By examining a sample of 136 non-
financial Finnish listed corporations with at least one large shareholder, the paper demonstrates 
that generally there is a positive relationship between the contestability (the ability to challenge 
the largest shareholder) of the controlling coalition's power and firm value (measured by Tobin's 
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Q). Consistent with Mishra (2011), the paper also finds out that the contestability becomes more 
pronounced if the firm is family owned. Laeven and Levine (2004) discuss the ownership 
structure of "beyond the biggest", which refers to multiple large shareholders. Using 
manufacturing firm data from thirteen European countries, the authors confirm the positive effect 
of MLS on firm value, especially when the second largest shareholder has a higher cash flow 
rights. Furthermore, the positive relationship between firm value and the cash flow rights of the 
second largest shareholder become more prominent when the difference of control rights of the 
largest and second largest shareholders decreases, indicating that the distribution of voting and 
cash flow rights across large shareholders matters (Laeven and Levine, 2008, p.29). Other 
studies such as Boubaker and Sami (2011) who study 402 French listed firms and find that MLS 
helps reduce information asymmetry problems and improves earnings informativeness and 
Gutiérrez and Tribó (2004) who demonstrate that in closely-held Spanish corporations the 
existence of MLS reduces private benefit extraction and enhances firm performance, which is 
consistent with bargaining and monitoring effects. 
On the other hand, however, literature also document that MLS can form a controlling coalition 
to pursue and share the diverted private benefits (Gomes and Novaes, 2001; Zwiebel, 1995; 
Winton, 1993). Gomes and Novaes (2001) find that the role of large shareholders is determined 
by firm characteristics and disclosure laws. With a shared control, the coalition group will prove 
a project only if it is beneficial to all the members of the group. For a given ownership stake in a 
group, there exist both bargaining effects and disagreement effects. Initially when the number of 
shareholders in the group is small, bargaining effects dominates; when the number of 
shareholders increases, disagreement effects begin to dominate. For firms whose investment 
opportunities are hard for insiders to evaluate, single large shareholder is a more efficient 
ownership structure. On the contrary, for firms whose investment opportunities are hard for 
outsiders to evaluate or the law protections of minority shareholders are weak, MLS is the best 
ownership structure (Gomes and Novaes, 2001). Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) also 
document that large shareholders can form a winning coalition to expropriate private benefits 
with a relatively small cash flow rights. In this way, when the expropriation happens, the 
winning coalition can divert more private gains using its sufficient voting rights, only at the 
expense of the reduction of its small cash flow rights (Laeven and Levine, 2008). Laeven and 
Levine (2008) demonstrate that corporate valuation is negatively associated with the dispersion 
14 
 
of equity rights of MLS. Zwiebel (1995) also conduct a detailed discussion on how the 
controlling coalitions are formed between large blockholders. Specifically, using game theory, he 
argues that when there is one blockholder who holds much larger amount of shares than anyone 
else, it reduces the incentives for small shareholders to enjoy the private benefits of the firm. In 
this situation, there is only one large shareholder in the firm with its size beyond a certain 
threshold. On the contrary, if such a large shareholder does not exist, then there will be several 
medium-size shareholders who form a coalition to expropriate private benefits through partial 
control. Alternatively, Winton (1993) addresses the free-rider problems in monitoring. He finds 
that if a large shareholder would like to monitor the manager's behaviour, s/he should have 
sufficient shareholdings and firm value increases with the largest shareholder's wealth. In this 
situation, it is better to have only one largest shareholder to monitor the manager. Increasing the 
number of MLS will negatively affect the efficiency of monitoring due to free-rider problems of 
MLS. Empirically, Faccio, Lang & Young (2001) find mixed results for Europe and Asia. They 
demonstrate that MLS increases dividend payouts for Europe (positive role of MLS), but 
decreases dividend payouts for Asia (negative role of MLS). Thomsen et al. (2006) find that 
there is a negative relationship between blockholder ownership and firm valuation and 
accounting profitability for Continental Europe while no significant relationship is found 
between blockholder ownership and firm value for US and UK. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), 
studying 223 US firms and treating the ownership as an endogenous variable, show that there is 
no significant relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration.  
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3. Hypotheses Development  
The bulk of studies have mainly examined the effect of two types of agency problems (managers 
vs. shareholders and controlling large vs. minority shareholders). However, studies report that a 
large number of firms around world feature large blockholders and often more than one 
blockholder with significant voting rights, for example, La Porta et al. (1999) in twenty-seven 
industrial countries, Faccio and Lang (2002) in Western Europe, Claessens et al. (2000) and 
Carney and Child (2012) in East Asia, and Holderness (2009) in U.S.A. Literature on the effect 
of multiple blockholders on a firm’s agency and governance environment has mixed predictions. 
First, the alignment of interest hypothesis suggests that MLS can collude with the dominant 
shareholder to extract sharable private benefits by expropriating firms’ resources away from the 
minority shareholders (Winton, 1993; Zwiebel, 1995). This hypothesis suggests that the 
existence of MLS possibly have a negative impact on internal governance and potentially 
exacerbate agency problems. Second, the efficient monitoring hypothesis suggests that MLS may 
either compete for corporate control by supporting (objecting) optimal (value-destroying) 
investments and preventing the dominant shareholder from expropriating the firm’s resources to 
gain the support from minority shareholders (Bloch and Hege, 2001; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 
2000), or discipline managers by injecting private information in equity prices through 
aggressive trading (Edmans and Manso, 2011). Empirical studies regarding the effect of MLS 
find both positive (Mishra, 2011; Attig et al., 2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005) and negative 
(Thomsen et al., 2006) impact on firm-level governance. However, none of the researches has 
studied the effect of the evolution of voting power of large shareholders, in particular, the long 
term shift in the voting power towards the large shareholders other than the dominant 
shareholder (e.g., the second large shareholder) on firm value and operating performance. 
Examination of the shift in power towards the second large shareholder will be the main goal of 
this thesis.  
In order to examine the effect of the shift in power towards the blockholders other than the 
dominant shareholder, we rely on the change in voting rights of the second largest shareholder as 
the main independent variable. Following La Porta et al. (2002) and Laeven and Levine (2004), 
we define a large shareholder as one holding ultimate voting rights of 10% or more. If there is no 
shareholder who holds more than 10% voting rights, then that firm is defined as a widely held 
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firm (WH). If there are more than one shareholder that hold at least 10% votes, then the firm is 
defined to have multiple large shareholders (MLS) and the second large shareholder is the one 
with second largest proportion of voting rights. If there is only one large shareholder that has at 
least 10% of voting rights then we define this type of firms as having single large shareholder 
(SLS) in its ownership structure.  
Our main test variable is the change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder, 
denoted by Vote2. This variable captures the evolution of the power of the second largest 
shareholder over a long-term from 1996 to 2008. Vote2 is defined as the change of the voting 
rights of the second largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008. We consider an increase in the voting 
rights of the second largest shareholder as an increase in power for the second large shareholder 
and consequently weakening of the power of the dominant shareholder. 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Firm Valuation 
Previous studies show that agency problems between the controlling and minority shareholders 
are more prominent in firms with a dominant shareholder. While we note above that analytical 
literature has mixed predictions about the effect of MLS and their power on firm valuation, the 
majority of empirical studies demonstrate a positive effect of MLS on firm valuation. For 
example, Attig et al. (2009) study the effect of MLS for nine East Asian countries and find that 
the voting power of MLS is associated with a higher valuation premium. Gutiérrez and Tribó 
(2004) also document that the ownership stake of MLS has a positive impact in improving firm 
valuation. Therefore, we expect the increase in the power of the second largest shareholder 
makes them more able to play a positive internal governance role and mitigate agency problems, 
and thus enhancing firm value.  
H1: In firms featuring a largest shareholder, firm value is positively associated with the 
increase in the power of the second largest shareholder; 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Operating Performance 
A number of studies suggest a positive relationship between MLS and operating performance. 
For instance, Maury and Pajuste (2005) find that the presence of MLS has a positive effect on 
operating performance by studying Finnish firms, indicating that the existence of MLS can 
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mitigate agency problems and limit the expropriation of minority shareholders. This finding is 
confirmed by Gutiérrez and Tribó (2004) by studying Spanish firms. 
Different from previous studies, we particularly focus on the effect of the shift in voting power 
away from the dominant shareholder over time on operating performance. We use ROA and ROE 
to proxy for operating performance. Based on the findings of previous studies on the role of 
MLS, we expect that the increase in voting rights of the second largest shareholder has a positive 
impact on both ROA and ROE. 
H2: In firms featuring a largest shareholder, firm’s operating performance is positively 
associated with the increase in power of the second largest shareholder; 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Capital Structure 
There are studies suggesting that capital structure serves as an important channel through which 
firm value and operating performance are affected. For example, Claessens et al. (2008) show 
that political connection is positively related to a better access to bank finance in Brazil, which in 
turn leads to higher stock market returns. Lin et al. (2013) suggest that firms with more efficient 
monitoring should borrow more from public debt which typically has longer maturity and less 
from bank debt which is typically short term. Therefore, after examining the effect of the change 
in power of the second largest shareholder on firm value and operating performance, we will 
explore the impact of the shift in power towards the second largest shareholder on capital 
structure, which could provide a possible channel through which MLS affect firm value and 
performance. According to Attig et al. (2008), firms featuring MLS have lower implied cost of 
equity. So when looking at firm’s capital structure, especially debt structure, MLS firms which 
have less severe agency problems and better internal governance can have an easier access to 
long term finance and lower interest rates due to better information quality. Therefore, such firms 
are capable of holding more long term debt. Therefore, we expect that the shift in power towards 
the second largest shareholder is positively associated with firm’s holding of long term debt. 
Similarly, firms featuring an increase in power of the second largest shareholder tend to hold less 
short term debt.  
H3a: In firms featuring a largest shareholder, firms’ holding of long term debt is positively 
associated with the increase in the power of the second largest shareholder;  
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H3b: In firms featuring a largest shareholder, firms’ holding of short term debt is negatively 
associated with the increase in the power of the second largest shareholder;  
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Operation Management 
Literature has shown that firm value and operating performance can be enhanced through 
different channels. For example, McNaughton et al. (2001) fill the “black box” about the 
relationship between value for customers and the creation of value for the owners of the firm. 
Specifically, the authors present a model that explains how market orientation creates customer 
value, enhances firm’s sustainable competitive advantage and therefore increases value of the 
firm through profitability and returns. They show that inventory is an important channel through 
which the firm can attract new customers, create customer value and thus enhancing firm 
valuation, since a lower inventory can shorten the sales cycle, increase earnings and reduce 
outgoing cash. We argue that when inventory decreases, the cost of logistics and the storage are 
also lower, which leads to a lower cost of selling goods and a higher efficiency in operation 
management. Based on the above argument, we perceive inventory to be an important channel to 
affect customer value, and financial performance, which in turn has an impact on firm value and 
performance. As we argued in the previous hypotheses, firms featuring MLS are associated with 
a higher firm value and better performance, partially because MLS are able to mitigate the 
expropriation of the benefits of minority shareholders by monitoring the dominant shareholder to 
implement a more efficient management strategy. When we consider inventory as a channel to 
affect firm performance, we can expect that MLS can monitor the dominant shareholder to take 
more efficient operation management strategies to achieve a lower inventory which can lead to a 
lower cost of storage, shorter sales cycle, higher earnings and profits, higher customer 
satisfaction and better financial perspectives, which thereby enhance firm performance and firm 
value. Therefore, we expect that firms featuring an increase in the power of the second largest 
shareholder have a lower inventory through which firm value can be increased. 
H4: In firms featuring a largest shareholder, inventory is negatively associated with the 
increase in the power of the second largest shareholder; 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Dividends Payout Ratio 
19 
 
Dividends policy has been considered as a very important indicator and signalling to outside 
investors about a firm’s information, earnings and future perspectives (Pettit, 1972; Brickley, 
1983; Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Bhattacharya, 1979). Typically, stock price increases 
(decreases) as firms increase (decrease) dividends, i.e. markets prefer stocks that pay high 
dividends. Miller and Modigliani (1961) study the relationship between dividends and future 
earnings and find that increased dividends are a positive signal for better future earnings. 
Actually, dividend is a very expensive tool of signalling. Firms which initiate or increase 
dividends sacrifice their opportunities of investing into other valuable projects with those cash 
(Miller and Rock, 1985), which makes dividends a very credible signal for firm valuation. If this 
is the case, we can perceive the increase of dividends as a way of mitigating information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. On the other hand, a firm can choose to increase its 
dividends if it is very confident about its future and wants to convey positive information about 
its future earnings to outside investors.  
Literature has suggested that MLS who compete for more control and more board positions by 
attracting the votes of small shareholders are likely to support policies that favour the outside 
small shareholders (Mishra, 2011; Bloch and Hege, 2001; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). 
Empirically, Faccio et al. (2001) suggest a positive relationship between MLS and dividends 
payout ratio for European countries. Boubaker and Sami (2011) find that MLS helps reduce 
information asymmetry problems and improves earnings informativeness. If this is the case, 
MLS who compete for more control can support a positive dividend policy as a way of 
mitigating agency problems and information asymmetry, and attracting small shareholders’ 
votes. Such firms are supposed to have better future earnings and firm value observed by 
investors than other firms. Therefore, we expect that the increase in power of the second largest 
shareholder (measured by the change in voting rights of the second largest shareholder) can 
mitigate agency problems, alleviate market information asymmetry and support a higher 
dividend payout ratio as a credible signal to outside shareholders.  
H5: In firms featuring a largest shareholder, dividends payout ratio is positively associated 
with the increase in the power of the second largest shareholder. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Sample Construction 
To investigate the effect of ownership structure on firm value, performance, debt structure, and 
dividends, we assemble an international data set on corporate ownership and firm characteristics. 
Our sample construction process starts with WorldScope database, which provides extensive 
financial and accounting data on public listing firms around the world. From WorldScope we 
obtain detailed financial and accounting information from which we are able to calculate Tobin's 
Q, ROA, ROE, debt structure, inventory, dividends payout ratio and other control variables. We 
consider firms represented in Claessens et al. (2000), Carney and Child (2010), and WorldScope 
for nine East Asian countries from 1995 to 2010. The nine East Asian countries are: Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. We 
match the ownership data from Claessens et al. (2000) and Carney and Child (2012). Claessens 
et al. (2000) includes ownership data (cash-flow and voting rights for all owners who have more 
than 5% of the outstanding shares of the company) for 2,980 publicly traded corporations (both 
financial and nonfinancial institutions) in nine East Asian countries in 1996, while Carney and 
Child (2012) records the same variables that Claessens et al. (2000) have acquired using a 10% 
share threshold for 1,296 largest publicly traded firms (in terms of market capitalization) from 
the same nine East Asian countries in 2008. Our ownership data set thus consists of the voting 
rights of the largest and the second largest shareholders in both 1996 and 2008 for us to calculate 
the change in power of the second large shareholder. It also includes the cash flow rights of the 
largest shareholder in both 1996 and 2008 for us to measure the change of the excess control of 
the dominant shareholder. As we have discussed in the hypotheses development section, 
following La Porta et al. (2002) and Laeven and Levine (2004), we define a large shareholder as 
one holding ultimate voting rights of 10% or more. If there is no shareholder who holds more 
than 10% voting rights, then that firm is defined as a widely held firm. If there are more than one 
shareholder that hold at least 10% votes, then the firm is defined to have multiple large 
shareholders (MLS) and the second large shareholder is the one with second largest proportion of 
voting rights. If there is only one large shareholder that has at least 10% of voting rights then we 
define this type of firms as having single large shareholder in its ownership structure. 
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To be retained in the sample, the firms must exist in both 1996 and 2008 since we are testing the 
effect of the change of change in voting power of the second large shareholder from 1996 to 
2008. Also, in order to calculate firm characteristics variables such as Tobin’s Q and ROA, we 
require that firms must exist in WorldScope database. Our sample thus consists of 6,060 firm-
year observations, covering 403 firms in nine East Asian countries from 1996 to 2010.  
Why we would like to choose East Asian countries? Firstly, the legal protections for 
shareholders of eight of the nine East Asian countries (except for Japan) are relatively weaker 
than those of European and US economies, which can make the role of MLS more prominent. 
Secondly, the majority of the firms have at least one large shareholder with voting rights of more 
than 10%. Furthermore, nearly 30% of the sample firms (37% in 1996 and 22% in 2008) feature 
a presence of MLS among firms with at least one large shareholder. This advantage of data 
makes it easier to empirically test the effect of MLS on firm value with the presence of at least 
one large shareholder. Thirdly, according to prior literature, these nine East Asian countries are 
characterised with stronger power of the largest shareholder and more severe agency problems 
(Attig et al., 2009; Claessens et al., 2002). 
4.2 Variable Specifications 
4.2.1 Main Dependent Variables 
In our paper, we will mainly test for the following firm characteristics and their relationship with 
the shift in power away from the dominant shareholder (i.e. increase in the power of the second 
large shareholder): firm valuation, operating performance, capital structure, operation 
management, and dividends payout ratio. Our main proxy for firm value is Tobin's Q, which is 
defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to their book value (Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988; Claessens et al., 2002; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). Following Maury and Pajuste 
(2005), Tobin's Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book 
value of equity, then all divided by the book value of total assets. Our proxies for operating 
performance are ROA and ROE. ROA is defined as net income divided by total assets (ratio 
provided by Datastream). ROE is defined as net income divided by shareholder’s equity (ratio 
provided by Datastream). Our main focus of investigating capital structure as an important 
channel through which MLS affect firm value is the debt structure of a firm, specifically whether 
22 
 
the firm tend to have long term or short term debt. Long term debt (Ldebt) is defined as the ratio 
of a firm’s long term debt to its total debt. Short term debt (Sdebt) is measured as the ratio of a 
firm’s short term debt to its total debt. Our proxy for firm’s operation management is Inventory, 
which is defined as the total inventory divided by total assets. Our proxy for firm’s dividend is 
dividends payout ratio, which is defined as dividends per share divided by earnings per share. 
Also, we winsorize all the dependent variables at 1th and 99th percentiles to avoid outliers. The 
market value of equity, the book value of total assets, the book value of equity, ROA, ROE, long 
term debt, short term debt, total debt, inventory, and dividends payout ratio are all from 
WorldScope database. 
4.2.2 Main Explanatory Variables 
4.2.2.1 The Evolution of Ownership Structure Variables 
Our proxies for the evolution of ownership structures are main test variables including the 
change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholders, denoted by Vote2. Since we 
examine the impact of Vote2 on firm value and performance in the firms featuring the dominant 
shareholder, we will control for the change of the voting rights of the largest shareholder, 
denoted by Vote1, as well as the change of the excess voting rights of the largest shareholder, 
denoted by Excess1. As discussed in hypotheses development, we expect the shift in power 
towards the second largest shareholder (i.e. Vote2) to be positively associated with Tobin's Q, 
ROA, ROE, Ldebt, and dividends payout ratio while negatively associated with Sdebt and 
Inventory (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Mishra, 2011; Attig et al., 2008).  
4.2.2.2 Control Variables 
Following previous studies, our main control variables are firm characteristics, including firm 
size, leverage, sales growth, and capital expenditure. According to Maury and Pajuste (2005), 
we use the logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size. We expect firm size to be positively 
associated with firm value since the larger a firm is, the more mature the firm is in its life cycle 
and has more intensive diversification (Attig et al., 2009; Claessens et al., 2002). We calculate 
leverage as the ratio of total debt to total assets. For leverage we expect it to negatively impact 
firm value since more leverage could increase the risk of financial distress (Laeven and Levine, 
2007; Gutiérrez and Tribó, 2004). Following M. Gutiérrez et al. (2012), sales growth is 
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measured by the difference between current and last year's net sales or revenues divided by last 
year's total net sales or revenues. We expect it to be positively associated with firm valuation and 
operating performance because the higher the growth rate is, the higher the firm value is and the 
better the operating performance is. Finally, Capital expenditure is defined as the total capital 
expenditure of a firm divided by average total assets in order to capture firm's investments (Attig 
et al., 2009). Like sales growth, capital expenditure is expected to be positively related with firm 
valuation because a firm which has a better growth opportunity and more capital expenditures is 
supposed to have a better performance and higher value (La Porta et al., 2002). For all the main 
control variables, we use lagged values instead of contemporaneous values to control for the 
impact of previous values on current dependent variables.  
Also, previous dependent variables are plausibly highly correlated with current values of 
dependent variables. For example, the current year of Tobin's Q is strongly affected by its last 
year value, i.e. lagged Tobin's Q. Therefore, in order to partial out the effect of previous values 
of dependent variables, we control for lagged values of dependent variables for the full sample, 
including lagged Tobin's Q, lagged ROA, lagged ROE, lagged long term debt, lagged short term 
debt, lagged inventory, and lagged dividends payout ratio. On the other hand, when using 
subsample of 2008-2010, we regress future values of dependent variables on the changes of 
ownership structure from 1996 to 2008. Therefore, instead of controlling for lagged dependent 
variables, we control for the change of the dependent variables from 1996 to 2008. 
In order to alleviate the impact of outliers of control variables, we winsorize all of them at the 
1th and 99th percentiles. Finally, apart from the above control variables, we also add year, 
industry, and country dummy variables in order to control for year, industry, and country fixed 
effects.  
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our main variables in the full sample.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics for dependent variables in our study. The average 
of Tobin’s Q across all firm-years is 1.226. The average of ROA and ROE are 5.064 and 0.069, 
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respectively. Long term and short term debt on average are 52.4% and 48.4% of total debt, 
respectively. The average dividends payout ratio across all firm-years is 0.257. Inventory on 
average is 10.8% of total assets. Panel B shows the evolution of ownership structure variables, 
which captures the change of ownership and control of the largest and second largest 
shareholders. On average Vote1 is 6.61, indicating that the voting rights (or control) of the 
dominant shareholder increase by 6.61 percentage point from 1996 to 2008. On the other hand, 
the excess control (control right minus ownership right) of the dominant shareholder barely 
changes during the period of 1996 to 2008, with an increase of merely about 0.3 percentage 
point. One interesting finding is that the voting rights of the second largest shareholder increase 
significantly by 13.74 percentage points, which suggests that the second largest shareholder is 
gaining more power in the control of the firms.  
Table 2 describes the pairwise correlation matrix between our key variables. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Our pairwise correlation results show that Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE are highly correlated 
among each other, especially between ROA and ROE. Unsurprisingly, firm valuation and 
operating performance strongly affect each other. The correlation between short term and long 
term debt is -1.00, largely because short term and long term debt are substitute in debt structure: 
the more the firm is borrowing long term debt, the less the firm is holding short term debt, given 
a certain level of total debt. Vote1 seems relatively more correlated with Vote2. Yet, the 
correlation coefficients among other variables do not appear too large to raise concerns for 
multicollinearity. 
4.4 Does the Ownership Structure Change over Time across Countries? 
Our compiled data represents the ownership structures of the nine East Asian countries in 1996 
and 2008, from which we are able to trace the change of the ownership structures for the nine 
countries over the two periods. Table 3 presents the composition of the existence of firms by 
countries and by years. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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From Table 3 we can find that the number of firms that exist in both 1996 and 2008 are 403, 
which represents 15.03% of our sample. More than half of the firms (56.79%) exist only in 1996, 
among which Japan has 810 firms, accounting for almost one-third of our sample. Among those 
firms which exist in both 1996 and 2008, Hong Kong has the largest number of firms, following 
by Japan and South Korea, while Taiwan has the least number of firms existing in both years. 
The range of numbers of firms across countries is small, however, from 24 to 74. Table 4 
describes the change of the ownership structures from 1996 to 2008 of our sample by year and 
country. Firstly, if we look at the change of ownership structures across years we can find that 
for firms that exist in 1996, about half of them have single large shareholder (SLS), nearly one-
third have MLS, and 21.6% of them are widely held firms. In 2008, the composition of 
ownership of firms has changed. Almost two-thirds of firms existing in 2008 are SLS, while the 
percentage of firms featuring MLS has decreased to 16.84%. The percentage of widely held 
firms basically remains the same, from 21.6% in 1996 to 23.2% in 2008. Secondly, in terms of 
country level, we can see that every country experiences a significant ownership structure 
changes from 1996 to 2008. For example, 2.58% firms existing in 1996 are SLS, while in 2008 it 
increases to 5.15%. The percentage of MLS of Taiwan firms decreases from 2.84% to 0.69% 
while widely held firms increase from 0.26% to 7.65%. The same changes also happen in 
Thailand, South Korea and Singapore. Japan has the largest percentage of firms of SLS and 
widely held (WH) in 1996. However, these percentages decrease significantly in 2008. The 
reason probably is that Claessens et al. (2000) select almost all the firms of East Asian countries, 
where almost half of them are Japanese firms, while Carney and Child (2012) only choose 200 
largest firms from each country which reduces the percentage of Japanese firms. On the other 
hand, the percentage of Hong Kong firms basically remains the same over time.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Now we take a closer look at the surviving firms, which exist in both 1996 and 2008. These 
firms consist of the main subsample we would like to test later on. Table 5 shows the change of 
ownership structures of the companies that exist in both 1996 and 2008 by country.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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The table shows that among the surviving firms, 50% of firms is SLS in 1996 while this 
percentage increases to 63.12% in 2008. The number of widely held firms also increases over 
time. However, the percentage of MLS decreases significantly from 37.6% to 15.1%, indicating 
that the number of firms featuring MLS has reduced over time: More than one-third of firms 
remain SLS and a quarter of firms change from MLS to SLS. The percentage of firms that 
remain MLS over time is only 8.17%. Also, we find that the surviving firms are basically evenly 
distributed among nine East Asian countries with a relatively small range. Most importantly, 
nearly 48% of firms change their ownership structure from 1996 to 2008, implying that almost 
half of the firms experience a significant change of the ownership structures over the decade. The 
most remarkable change is firms changing from MLS to SLS. When looking at different 
countries, we can see that nearly 80% of firms from Taiwan have experienced a change of 
ownership over time. Thailand and Singapore also have more than 70% of firms undergoing a 
change of ownership structure. Almost half of the firms from Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Philippines have their ownership structure changed. One-third of firms in Japan are no longer 
remaining their ownership structures. Hong Kong has the least percentage of firms going through 
structure changes, merely with 28.3% of firms.  
In a brief conclusion, the percentage of MLS firms decreases from 28.99% to 16.84%, while SLS 
firms increase remarkably. Also, the descriptive analysis shows that the ownership structures of 
each country change significantly from 1996 to 2008. For those surviving firms, the percentage 
of MLS firms decreases while firms featuring SLS and WH increase over time. Most of the 
countries experience a prominent change of ownership structures, with the most remarkable 
conversion being firms changing from MLS to SLS (25% of the surviving firms). Therefore, it is 
very obvious that the nine East Asian countries all have a significant change of ownership 
structures during the period of 1996 to 2008 and there are a decreasing number of firms featuring 
MLS over time.  
4.4 Methodology  
Theoretical corporate governance research regarding the role of MLS is limited. Although Maury 
and Pajuste (2005), Attig et al. (2009) and others examine whether MLS can mitigate extraction 
of private benefits of minority shareholders, empirical studies are also inconclusive. Our paper 
contributes to current literature and fills this gap by (1) investigating the impact of the evolution 
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of MLS (i.e. the shift in power towards the second largest shareholder) on firm value and 
operating performance, and how the increase in power of the second largest shareholder play an 
important monitoring role in mitigating expropriation of minority interest and information 
asymmetry; and (2) empirically examining plausible channels through which the increase in 
power of the second largest shareholder can affect firm valuation and performance. Specifically, 
we estimate several specifications of the following models: 
                                                                              
                     
We specify the regression variables as follows: 
Firm characteristics=firm valuation measured by Tobin's Q, operating performance measured by 
ROA and ROE, debt structure captured by long term debt and short term debt, operation 
management measured by inventory, and dividend policy measured by dividends payout ratio; 
Ownership structure variables=proxies for the change in voting rights of the largest and second 
largest shareholders, denoted by Vote1 and Vote2; 
Control variables=a set of variables that capture other firm characteristics, including firm size, 
sales growth, capital expenditure and leverage; 
Fixed effects=dummy variables that control for fixed effects of years, countries, and industries; 
Ɛ=an error term. 
Discussions about endogeneity issues: It is important to emphasize that our results might be the 
suspect of potential endogeneity problems. First, this thesis is subjected to omitted variable 
problems. The ownership structure and dependent variables may be jointly determined by the 
environment the firm is in, such as legal protection environment. Second, one might suspect that 
that our results might be an outcome of a possible reverse causality problem. We try to address 
them with the following methods. First, we control for fixed effects including year, country, as 
well as industry fixed effects in each of our regressions. Second, we construct a subsample of 
2008 to 2010, while our key test variables are measured over 1996 to 2008 to test how the shift 
in power towards the second largest shareholder affects future firm value and performance. 
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Thirdly, we perform a robustness test using the industry-country average change in voting rights 
of the second large shareholder as the proxy of the shift in power away from the dominant 
shareholder.  
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Firm Valuation 
Previous studies show that agency problems between the controlling and minority shareholders 
are more prominent in firms with a dominant shareholder. Therefore, in order to better examine 
the role of the shift in power towards the second largest shareholder, for each regression we 
restrict our sample to the firms with at least one large shareholder with 10% or more voting 
rights in 2008. As we discuss above, whether MLS can help alleviate agency problems and 
improve firm valuation is still an empirical question, and previous studies only focus on the 
impact of the existence and the level of voting rights of MLS on firm valuation. In the section we 
primarily focus on the effect of the shift in power towards the second largest shareholder (i.e. the 
change in the voting rights of the second largest shareholder) on firm valuation. We present the 
multivariate regression results for the full sample of 1996-2010 in Model (1) to (3) of Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Since we are testing the role of Vote2 in firms featuring at least one dominant shareholder, in 
each model we control for the characteristics of the largest shareholder either with the change of 
the voting rights of the largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 (Vote1) or with the change of the 
excess voting power of the largest shareholder (Excess1). Model (1) presents the regression of 
Tobin's Q on Vote1 and Vote2 without other control variables. The coefficient of Vote1 is 
significantly negative at 1% level, indicating a negative relationship between the change in 
power of the dominant shareholder and Tobin's Q. The coefficient of Vote2 is negative and 
significant at 1%, suggesting that it has a positive impact on Tobin's Q. The coefficient of 
Vote2 suggests that one standard deviation increase of the voting power of the second largest 
shareholder from 1996 to 2008 improves the level of Tobin's Q by 0.011*17.891=0.1968 per 
dollar of capital invested in the firm’s assets. When we add other control variables in Model (2), 
however, the coefficient of Vote1 is becomes insignificant, while the coefficient Vote2 
remains positive and significant at 1% level. When we use the change of the excess voting rights 
of the largest shareholder (Excess1) instead of Vote1 in Model (3), Excess1 is weakly 
negative and Vote2 is positive and significant at 1% level. For the insignificance of Vote1, one 
possible explanation is that dominant shareholder has the incentives to monitor the activities of 
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the manager in order to reduce agency problems between the manager and shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997), but this benefit is largely offset by another type of agency problems caused 
by the conflicts of interest between the largest shareholder and minority shareholders. The 
positive sign of the change in power of the second largest shareholder (Vote2) in each model 
suggests that the second largest shareholder have a positive impact on firm value. This finding is 
consistent with previous studies about the positive role of MLS in mitigating agency problems 
and increasing firm value.  
While we find positive effect of the long term shift in power towards the second largest 
shareholder on firm value, our tests are suspects for endogeneity bias, particularly because the 
timing of the measurement of shift in power overlaps the time in which we measure dependent 
variables. First, the ownership structure and firm characteristics may be jointly determined by the 
environment the firm is in, such as legal protection environment. For example, widely held firms 
are more common in US and UK than in East Asian countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, 
partly because counties like US and UK have a better legal protection for investors than 
developing countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. As a result, ownership is more concentrated in 
countries with weak investor protection (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). While our 
paper focuses on nine East Asian countries where most of them have relatively weak investor 
protections, we address this omitted variable issue by controlling for country effects. Second, 
although one can argue that an increase in controlling power of the second largest shareholder 
may lead to a better firm performance, others can also argue that large shareholders voluntarily 
choose firms with better value and performance and then stay passive (Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001). The situation can be that the manager in the firm is doing a very good job and the firm is 
showing to the market about its promising future earnings. Therefore, such kind of firms may 
attract large investors, suggesting that causality flows from firm value to the prevalence and 
power of MLS. In order to address this issue, first, we replicate our tests in the subsample 
representing 2008-2010. In this subsample the dependent variables are measured subsequent to 
2008, while the key test variable Vote2 is measured over 1996 to 2008. We believe that it 
would be less likely that the dependent variables measured as of 2008 to 2010 affect the 
decisions of the large blockholders to initiate the change in their holdings of firm’s securities 
over 1996 to 2008. Second, we use the industry-country average change in voting rights of the 
second large shareholder as the proxy of the shift in power away from the dominant shareholder. 
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The rationale is that while it is possible that firm specific valuation variables may affect their 
blockholders’ intention to change ownership, however, the effect of such tendency in one firm 
would be much lower for industry and country as a whole, i.e. a firm’s valuation is less likely to 
have impact on industry-country level ownership.
2
 
Model (4) to (6) present the relationship between the shift in power towards the second largest 
shareholder (Vote2) and Tobin’s Q with subsample of 2008 to 2010. We replicate the 
regressions of Model (1) to (3) with one difference, i.e. in Model (4) to (6) we control for the 
change of Tobin’s Q from 1996 to 2008 in place of the lagged one-year Tobin’s Q. In all models 
we find that the coefficient of Vote2 is positive and significant at 1% level.  
Next, Model (7) to (9) present the regressions using the industry-country average change in 
voting rights of the second large shareholder as the main independent variable. Using full sample 
of firm-years, in Model (7) we regress Tobin’s Q on industry-country average of Vote1 and 
Vote2 without other control variables. In Model (8) we regress Tobin’s Q on industry-country 
average of Vote1 and Vote2 with other control variables, while in Model (9) we control for 
the change of the excess control of the dominant shareholder (Excess1) and regress Tobin’s Q 
on industry-country average of Vote2 with other control variables. We find that industry-
country means of Vote2 is significantly and positively associated with Tobin’s Q, further 
mitigating the concern that our results are outcome of the causality flowing from firm value to 
blockholder’s decision to change ownership. 
Now that we have found that the shift in voting power towards the second largest shareholder 
(i.e. the shift in power away from the dominant shareholder) can play a positive role in 
increasing firm valuation and alleviating agency problems, below we present tests of the impact 
of the change in voting rights of the second large shareholder on operating performance and 
                                                          
 
2
 In order to alleviate the endogeneity bias, we also use a subsample of firms that remain their ownership structures 
over time (i.e. SLS-SLS, MLS-MLS, and WH-WH firms) and construct a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the 
firms remain MLS over time and 0 otherwise as the test variable, denoted by MLS. The results show that MLS is 
significantly positive at 1% level, indicating that MLS ownership structure over time mitigates agency problems and 
increase firm value. By using this test variable, we can test the effect of the persistent ownership structure on firm 
value. Since in this subsample the ownership structures of the firms do not change over a long time, this test helps us 
mitigate endogeneity problems in that we can rule out the possibility that the higher firm value attracts investors to 
select the good quality firms and stay passively.  
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other channels through which shift in power away from the dominant shareholder may increase 
firm value.  
5.2 Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Operating Performance 
Previous studies find positive effect of MLS on operating performance. For instance, Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) examine the role of MLS and find that MLS have a positive effect on operating 
performance even though this positive effect greatly depends on the identity of MLS. Similar 
results can also be found in Attig et al. (2009) who use ROA, net margin, and sales growth to 
demonstrate the positive relationship between MLS and operating performance. Using Spanish 
closely-held firms, Gutiérrez and Tribó (2004) find that the existence of MLS reduces private 
benefit expropriation and enhance operating performance and the performance improves as the 
number of MLS increases. However, there exists a gap in terms of the internal governance role 
of MLS on operating performance from the shift in power away from the dominant shareholder 
perspective, which is the main focus of this section. When studying whether the increase in 
power of the second largest shareholder can help improve operating performance, we mainly use 
ROA and ROE as the measurements for performance. Based on previous research, we expect 
that both the relationship between the change in voting rights of the second large shareholder 
(Vote2) and ROA and the relationship between the change in voting rights of the second large 
shareholder (Vote2) and ROE to be positive. In other words, an increase in power of the second 
largest shareholder can mitigate the extraction of private benefits by the dominant shareholder 
and improve operating performance.  
Firstly, we test the impact of the change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder on 
ROA and present our multivariate regressions for our full sample of 1996-2010 in Table 7.  
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
Previous research shows that the effective role of MLS is more prominent in firms featuring at 
least one large shareholder. Therefore, in the similar manner as we test for Tobin’s Q, in order to 
better capture the effect of MLS we only test for firms that have at least one large shareholder 
with voting rights of at least 10% in 2008 and in each model we control for the change in power 
of the largest shareholder. Model (1) to (3) show the regression results for the testing of ROA 
using the full sample of 1996-2010. In Model (1) we regress ROA solely on Vote1 and Vote2, 
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without controlling other firm factors except for year, industry and country fixed effects. The 
coefficient for Vote1 is negative but insignificant. Although there is a negative relationship 
between the change in voting rights of the largest shareholder and ROA, this relationship is not 
remarkable. Vote2 is positive and significant at 1%, suggesting that without controlling other 
firm factors, as the voting rights of the second largest shareholder increase ROA also increases. 
In Model (2) we regress ROA on Vote1 and Vote2 and control for other firm characteristics as 
well as lagged ROA. Like Model (1), after controlling for other factors and fixed effects, Vote2 
is still significant at 1% level while Vote1 remains negative but insignificant. The results show 
that ROA is positively associated with the change of the voting power of the second largest 
shareholder. As the second largest shareholder increases his/her stakes from 1996 to 2008 by one 
standard deviation, the level of ROA increases by 0.056*17.891=1.002. The negative but 
insignificant sign of Vote1 indicates that although the largest shareholder can mitigate agency 
problems between the manager and shareholders to some extent, s/he increases the drawback of 
another type of agency problem between the dominant shareholder and small shareholders and 
this drawback even slightly outweighs the benefits of having the dominant shareholder. Model 
(3) regresses ROA on Vote2 and Excess1, controlling for other firm characteristics. Similar to 
what we expect for Tobin’s Q, we also expect a negative relationship between ROA and 
Excess1 because the more excess control the dominant shareholder has, the more incentives 
s/he has to expropriate the benefits of minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002). The 
regression results show that the coefficient of Excess1 is negative, as we expect, but not 
significant. Vote2 is still significantly positive at 1% level, suggesting that the shift in power 
away from the dominant shareholder indeed has a strongly positive impact on firm's ROA. The 
increase in power of the second largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 improves ROA 
prominently, consistent with the effective role of MLS in mitigating agency and information 
asymmetry problems and thus enhancing operating performance (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Attig 
et al., 2009; Gutiérrez and Tribó, 2004). 
Like our tests for Tobin’s Q, our tests for ROA are also subjected to endogeneity bias. Therefore, 
we address endogeneity issues in the similar manner as reported in Tobin’s Q by using the 
subsample of 2008-2010 and also the industry-country average change in voting rights of the 
second large shareholder as the test variable. Model (4) to (6) are the regression results for the 
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subsample of 2008-2010 to address the reverse causality issues. The coefficients for Vote2 are 
significantly positive, suggesting that an increase in power of the second largest shareholder is 
positively associated with a higher future operating performance, which is consistent with the 
results for the full sample. In Model (7) to (9) we regress ROA on the industry-country average 
of Vote2. Similarly, we find significantly positive impact of the industry-country average of 
Vote2 on ROA, indicating that the industry-country level of average change in voting rights of 
the second large shareholder leads to a higher ROA, but it is unlikely that firm level ROA can 
impact the industry-country level of change in voting rights of the second large shareholder, 
which suggests a potential correction for endogeneity bias. 
Secondly, we test the impact of the change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder 
on ROE and present our multivariate regressions for our full sample of 1996-2010 in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Model (1) to (3) show the regressions for ROE as the dependent variable using the full sample of 
1996-2010. Basically we get the same results for ROE as we get for ROA. In Model (1) without 
the control variables, Vote1 shows a weakly negative relationship with ROE, while Vote2 is 
significantly positive at 1% level, indicating a positive impact of an increase in power of the 
second largest shareholder on ROE. In Model (2) we regress ROE on Vote1 and Vote2 with 
the control variables. The results show that Vote1 remains weakly negative while Vote2 is still 
strongly positive at 1% level. Consistent with previous studies regarding to the role of MLS, we 
find that an increase in power of the second largest shareholder has a significantly positive 
impact on operating performance. Model (3) is the regression of ROE on Vote2 and Excess1 
with control variables and fixed effects. The regression results suggest that even though the 
increase of the excess control of the dominant shareholder has a negative impact on ROE, this 
impact is trivial. Vote2 still remains significantly positive at 1%, implying that ROE is 
positively associated with the increase of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder.  
In Model (4)-(9) we address the endogeneity bias in the similar manner as we do for ROA. In 
Model (4)-(6) we replicate the regressions of the full sample using the subsample of 2008 to 
2010. Similar to what we find for ROA, Vote2 is significantly and positively associated with 
future ROE. The results suggest that an increase in power of the second largest shareholder leads 
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to a higher future operating performance, which is a potential correction for reverse causality 
problems. Model (7) to (9) are the regressions of ROE on the industry-country level of average 
change in voting rights of the second large shareholder (industry-country average of Vote2). 
We find that the coefficients of industry-country average of Vote2 are positively significant for 
all the regressions. These tests using industry-country average of Vote2 suggest that it is less 
possible that the industry-country level of average change in power of the second large 
shareholder is affected by firm level ROE, but more likely that the industry-country average 
change in power of the second large shareholder affect ROE, which addresses the endogeneity 
bias.  
In a brief conclusion, previous studies suggest a positive relationship between MLS and 
operating performance. On one hand, since the existence of the dominant shareholder extracts 
private benefits of minority investors, MLS can play a monitoring role by either promoting 
beneficial investment decisions to maximize shareholders' profits or objecting sub-optimal or 
value-destroying activities to mitigate the expropriation of the benefits of minority shareholders, 
thus enhancing operating performance. On the other hand, MLS who seek to gain more control 
or board positions in a firm can attract the votes from minority shareholders by voting for 
investments that favour the benefits of those minority shareholders (Bloch and Hege, 2001). 
Therefore, we forecast a positive relationship between MLS and operating performance 
measured by ROA and ROE. Consistent with literature, we find that an increase in power of the 
second largest shareholder has a strongly positive impact on both ROA and ROE, with or 
without controlling for other firm characteristics. This finding shows the efficient monitoring 
role of MLS as found by previous studies, suggesting that MLS can help alleviate agency 
problems, enhance internal governance, and improve operating performance. The fact that 
Vote1 and Excess1 are negative but not significant is probably due to the offset between two 
types of agency problems (dominant shareholder vs. minority shareholders and the manager vs. 
small shareholders).  
5.3 Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Capital Structure 
After we find that a shift in power towards the second largest shareholder is associated with 
higher firm valuation and better operating performance, we further examine whether the increase 
in power of the second largest shareholder has significant impact on possible channels through 
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which firm valuation and operating performance are affected. Literature has demonstrated that 
firm valuation can be affected through capital structure. For example, Claessens et al. (2008) 
demonstrate that political connection is related to a preferential access to bank finance in 
emerging markets, which in turn can help firms to achieve higher stock market returns. Also Lin 
et al. (2013) find that firms with less monitoring needs and less agency problems have better 
access to public debt which typically have longer maturities. For firms featuring MLS, agency 
problems are less severe than those in firms without MLS. According to Attig et al. (2008), firms 
with MLS tend to have a lower implied cost of equity. Therefore, such firms as MLS firms 
should have easier access to long term finance. On the other hand, MLS firms should have less 
holding of short term debt in order to avoid paying out too much cash frequently. Furthermore, 
we argue that when the power of the second largest shareholder increases, it weakens the power 
of the dominant shareholder, which dampens the incentive of the benefit extraction from 
minority shareholders to the dominant shareholder. Therefore, such shift of power from the 
dominant shareholder to the second largest shareholder can lead to a lower cost of long term 
financing and improved access to long term finance for optimal investments. Based on this 
argument, we expect the relationship between the increase in power of the second largest 
shareholder and firm's long term debt to be positive and the relationship between the increase in 
power of the second largest shareholder and firm's short term debt to be negative. 
First, we examine the effect of the increase in power of the second largest shareholder on firm's 
long term debt. We report our multivariate regression results of long term debt for the full 
sample of 1996-2010 in Model (1) to (3) of Table 9.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Similar to the method we test for operating performance, we also focus on firms which have at 
least one large shareholder of 10% or more voting rights in 2008 where agency problems are 
considered more prominent in such firms. Model (1) to (3) present the regression results for the 
full sample of 1996-2010. In Model (1) of Table 9 we solely regress long term debt on Vote1 
and Vote2 and control for year, industry and country effects, without controlling for other firm 
characteristics. Both signs of Vote1 and Vote2 are positive and but only significant for 
Vote2. Model (2) demonstrates the regression of long term debt on Vote1 and Vote2 by 
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controlling other firm characteristics as well as lagged long term debt. The results show that after 
controlling for other firm characteristics Vote2 is significantly positive at 1% level, while 
Vote1 is still not significant. This suggests that the change of voting rights of the second largest 
shareholder is positively associated with long term debt. The increase in power of the second 
largest shareholder weakens the power of the dominant shareholder, which mitigates agency 
problems and lowers cost of long term financing. The insignificance of Vote1 indicates that the 
change of the voting rights of the dominant shareholder does not have significant impact on 
firm's choice of long term debt, which is probably due to the offset between the benefits and 
costs of the two types of agency problems. In Model (3) we regress long term debt on Vote2 
and Excess1. According to Claessens et al. (2002), the excess control rights over cash flow 
rights of the dominant shareholder have a negative impact on firm valuation. Therefore, we 
expect the sign of Excess1 to be negative because an increase in the excess control power of the 
dominant shareholder exaggerates agency problems, increases the cost of long term financing, as 
opposed to the role of MLS, thus decreasing a firm's holding of long term debt. Model (3) shows 
that Vote2 is still significantly positive at 1% level. The more the second largest shareholder 
increases its voting rights, the more the firm will be holding long term debt. On the other hand, 
the coefficient of Excess1 is positive but not significant. Since the coefficient of Excess1 is 
trivial, we do not find a significant impact of an increase in the excess of the voting rights of the 
dominant shareholder on firm's holding of long term debt.  
Based on Model (1) to (3) for full sample of 1996-2010, we find that the increase of the voting 
power of the second largest shareholder is positively associated with firm's long term debt. With 
a shift of power from the dominant shareholder to the second largest shareholder from 1996 to 
2008, the firm lowers its cost of long term debt financing. This finding is consistent with Attig et 
al. (2008) which suggest that MLS helps reduce implied cost of equity. However, we do not find 
a significant impact of the change of the voting rights of the largest shareholder on firm's long 
term debt.  
As we discussed in the previous section, our tests are suspect for endogeneity bias due to the fact 
that the timing of the measurement of the change of voting rights overlaps the time in which we 
measure dependent variables. Following what we did to address endogeneity problems for firm 
value and operating performance, we also construct a subsample of 2008-2010 and use industry-
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country average change of the second largest shareholder to test for long term debt. Model (4)-
(6) are the regression results for the subsample of 2008-2010 in which we measure long term 
debt subsequent to 2008. When we regress Ldebt only on Vote1 and Vote2 in Model (4) we do 
not find significant results for Vote2. However, after we control for other firm characteristics in 
Model (5) and (6), we find that Vote2 is significantly positive at 1% level, which is consistent 
with the full sample results. The results in Model (4)-(6) suggest that the increase in power of the 
second largest shareholder is associated with a higher future long term debt. Model (7)-(9) 
present the regression results for industry-country average change of the second largest 
shareholder as the test variable. Consistent with our findings for the full sample and the 
subsample, the coefficients for industry-country average of ∆Vote2 are significantly positive 
(significant at 1% level in Model (7) and 5% level in Model (8) and (9)), which suggests that the 
industry-country average change of the second largest shareholder has a positive impact on firm 
level long term debt. However, it is unlikely that an individual firm’s long term debt can 
meaningfully affect industry-country average change of the second largest shareholder, which we 
believe can mitigate the endogeneity problems.  
Next we will test the effect of an increase in power of the second largest shareholder on short 
term debt. We expect that a shift in power away from the dominant shareholder helps dampen 
the expropriation of private benefits by the dominant shareholder and lowers the cost of long 
term financing, which leads to less short term debt.  
We report our multivariate regression results of short term debt for the full sample in Model (1) 
to (3) of Table 10.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Like the regressions for long term debt, we test with the same independent variables here. Model 
(1) is the regression of short term debt on Vote1 and Vote2 by only controlling for year, 
industry and country fixed effects. Both coefficients of Vote1 and Vote2 are negative while 
only Vote2 is significant at 1%. The regression results imply that without controlling for other 
firm characteristics the change in power of the second largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 has 
a significantly negative effect on short term debt. Model (2) shows the regression of short term 
debt on Vote1 and Vote2 by controlling for other factors as well as fixed effects. The results 
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indicate that Vote2 is still significantly negative at 1% level and the coefficient of Vote1 is not 
significant. The multivariate regressions suggest that the shift in power towards the second 
largest shareholder has a significantly negative effect on firm's short term debt. An increase of 
the voting rights of the second largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 is associated with a lower 
cost of long term financing, which leads to a decrease in short term debt. Short term debt 
requires the firm to pay out cash frequently and therefore hurts the benefits of small 
shareholders. The increase in power of the second largest shareholder helps reduce short term 
debt suggests that it can protect the benefits of small shareholders and mitigate agency problems, 
thus play an efficient role in internal governance (Attig et al., 2008). The weakly negative 
coefficient of Vote1 is probably due to the shift from one type of agency problem (manager vs. 
shareholders) to another (dominant shareholder vs. small shareholders) and the pros and cons of 
the two types of agency problems are just about to be equal. In Model (3) we regress short term 
debt on Vote2 and Excess1 while controlling for all the other factors. Accordingly, we expect 
Excess1 to be positively associated with short term debt. The results for Model (3) show that 
Vote2 is consistent with Model (1) and (2) and is significantly negative at 1% level, which 
lends support to the effective role of MLS in better access to long term financing, reducing short 
term debt, and mitigating agency problems. We do not find any significant impact of the change 
of the excess of control rights of the largest shareholder on short term debt since Excess1 is not 
significant and only weakly negative.  
Based on our results for short term debt, we find that an increase in power of the second largest 
shareholder has a significantly negative impact on firm's holding of short term debt: a shift in 
power from the dominant shareholder to the second largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 is 
associated with a reduction of short term debt. The results support previous studies about the 
corporate governance role of MLS, which alleviates agency problems between the dominant 
shareholder and minority shareholders and therefore lowers the cost of long term financing (Lin 
et al., 2013). However, we cannot find significant relationship between the change of the voting 
rights of the largest shareholder and short term debt. The reason is probably that the benefit of 
having a dominant shareholder to monitor the manager is cancelled out by the side effect caused 
by this largest shareholder to expropriate the benefits of minority shareholders. Similar to what 
40 
 
we find for long term debt, we have not found significant results for the excess of the control 
rights of the dominant shareholder.  
We try the following tests to address endogeneity problems. Firstly, we construct the subsample 
of 2008-2010 using the change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder from 1996 
to 2008 as the test variable. The results are shown in Model (4)-(6) of Table 10. In Model (4) 
where we regress Sdebt only on Vote1 and Vote2 without control variables, the coefficient of 
Vote2 is not significant. When we add other firm characteristics control variables we find a 
significantly negative effect of the change in power of the second largest shareholder on future 
short term debt. Similar results are found for Model (6) in which we control for the change of the 
excess control rights of the largest shareholder. The tests with the dependent variables measured 
subsequent to 2008 show that the change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder 
has a significantly negative impact on firm’s future short term debt. Firms featuring an increase 
in power of the second largest shareholder dampen the incentives and ability of the dominant 
shareholder to extract private benefits from the minority shareholders, therefore reduce firms’ 
future short term debt. Secondly, similar to what we do for long term debt, we also use the 
industry-country average change in power of the second large shareholder as the proxy of the 
shift in power away from the dominant shareholder, which are shown in Model (7)-(9). 
Consistent with our full and subsample results, we find that industry-country average change in 
power of the second large shareholder has a negative impact on short term debt, mitigating the 
concern that our results are outcome of the causality flowing from cost of long term debt 
financing to blockholder’s decision to change ownership. 
In conclusion, consistent with previous studies regarding to the effective role of MLS, we find 
that the shift in power towards the second largest shareholder has a positive impact on long term 
debt and it is negatively associated with short term debt. An increase in power of the second 
largest shareholder, which helps mitigate agency problems and improve internal governance, can 
reduce the cost of long term financing, lower interest rates and attract more long term debt. 
Meanwhile, we do not find significant relationship between the dominant shareholder and firm's 
debt structure.  
5.4 Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Operation Management 
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As we argued in the hypotheses development, inventory can serve as a channel through which 
firm value is enhanced. Typically, McNaughton et al. (2001) document lower inventory as a way 
to lower the cost of storage and selling goods, attract new customers, and indirectly improve 
financial performance, which leads to a better firm performance. Since in the previous sections 
we demonstrate that a shift in power from the dominant shareholder to the second largest 
shareholder mitigates the agency problems between the dominant shareholder and minority 
shareholders and is positively associated with firm value, we propose that an increase in power 
of the second largest shareholder can monitor the dominant shareholder to implement more 
efficient management strategies to decrease inventory which thereby improve firm performance 
and increase firm valuation. Therefore, we expect the coefficient of Inventory to be negative, i.e. 
the higher the increase of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder, the lower inventory 
the firm has.  
In Table 11 we present the regression results for the role of the change of the voting rights of the 
second largest shareholder on operation management. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
In Model (1) to (3) we test the impact of the shift in power away from the dominant shareholder 
on operation management with the full sample of 1996 to 2010. In Model (4) to (6) we replicate 
our regressions with the subsample of 2008-2010 and in Model (7)-(9) we use the industry-
country average change in power of the second largest shareholder in place of firm level change 
to address endogeneity bias. In Model (1) we regress Inventory on only Vote1 and Vote2. 
Vote2 is significantly negative at 1% while Vote1 is positive at 1% level. This result shows 
that firms featuring an increase in power of the second largest shareholder have fewer inventories 
in order to improve the operation management efficiency. In Model (2) we add more control 
variables and find a consistent result. When there is an increase in power of the second largest 
shareholder, the firm will reduce its inventory. Our interpretation is that the increase of the 
controlling power of the second largest shareholder can enhance the monitoring role to restrict 
the benefit expropriations by the dominant shareholder so that they can take strategies to improve 
operation management which can serve as an important channel through which firms improve 
their operating performance and firm valuation. In Model (3) we regress Inventory on Vote2 
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and Excess1 with all the control variables. The results indicate that the shift in power towards 
the second largest shareholder has a negative impact on inventory in firms featuring an excess 
control of voting rights by the dominant shareholder.  
In order to mitigate endogeneity problems, first we replicate the regressions with the subsample 
of future inventory from 2008 to 2010. Consistent with our full sample results, for all the three 
regressions in Model (4) to (6) inventory is negatively associated with Vote2 at 1% level, which 
suggests that firms featuring a gain in controlling power of the second largest shareholder have 
significantly less future inventory which serves as a channel to enhance firm valuation and 
improve firm performance. Second, we replicate the regressions of the full sample with the 
industry-country average change in voting rights of the second largest shareholder in Model (7) 
to (9). In Model (7) we regress Inventory on industry-country average of Vote1 and industry-
country average of Vote2 and find that industry-country average of Vote2 is significantly 
negative at 1%, which is consistent with our findings for the full sample. However, when we add 
other control variables in Model (8) and (9), the negative impact of industry-country average of 
Vote2 on inventory is washed away though it is still negative.  
In a brief conclusion, consistent with previous literature which suggests inventory as a channel to 
indirectly enhance firm value through internal business processes, customer satisfaction and 
financial performance, we find supporting evidence that the shift in power towards the second 
largest shareholder, which weakens the controlling power of the dominant shareholder, is 
negatively associated with inventory. This means that firms featuring an increase of the 
controlling power of the second largest shareholder typically have lower inventory, largely due 
to the monitoring role of other large shareholders beyond the dominant shareholder to enforce 
the dominant shareholder to take more efficient operation management strategies. Such firms as 
having a lower inventory can lower their cost of storage, shorten their sales cycle, improve their 
customer satisfaction and value, and have a better financial performance, which leads to a better 
firm performance and a higher firm value.  
5.5 Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Dividends Payout Ratio 
Literature suggests that dividend is a very important and costly signal to outside shareholders 
about firm’s future earnings and firm value. When investors see an increase of dividends, they 
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perceive this increase as a signal that the firm has a strong confidence about its better future 
earnings (Pettit, 1972; Brickley, 1983; Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Therefore, it is reasonable 
to think that markets prefer firms that pay higher dividends or firms that increase their dividends. 
A firm which has a strong confidence about its future and wants to deliver a positive signal to 
attract its outside investors can increase its dividends which can mitigate information asymmetry 
and convey prosperous future earnings information. A bulk of studies document that MLS firms 
can mitigate agency problems and improve internal governance through supporting better 
policies that are beneficial to small shareholders, as argued by Mishra (2011) and Bloch and 
Hege (2001), and in turn increase firm value and firm performance. Therefore, MLS can support 
higher dividends payout policies that alleviate agency problems and information asymmetry to 
attract more votes from the outside shareholders. Based on the above argument, we expect that 
when the controlling power of the second largest shareholder increases, it enhances the effective 
monitoring role of the second largest shareholder to dampen the benefit expropriations from 
minority shareholders, which therefore is associated with a higher dividends payout ratio that 
favours the benefits of minority shareholders. In the same manner as we test for the previous 
sections, we will first show our regression results for the full sample of 1996-2010 and second 
perform our robustness tests in order to address endogeneity problems. 
Table 12 presents the relationship between the change of the voting rights of the second largest 
shareholder and dividends payout ratio. In Model (1) to (3) we use the full sample of 1996 to 
2010 to test the effect of the change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder on 
dividends payout ratio. In order to address endogeneity bias, Model (4) to (6) we test the effect 
of the change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 on future 
dividends payout ratio using subsample from 2008 to 2010 while in Model (7) to (9) we replicate 
our regressions of the full sample with the industry-country average change in voting rights of 
the second largest shareholder as the main test variable.  
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
Consistent with our previous tests, we select firms which have at least one large shareholder with 
no smaller than 10% voting rights in 2008. In Model (1) we regress payout ratio on Vote1 and 
Vote2 only without controlling for other firm characteristics except for fixed effects. The 
regression result shows that an increase in power of the second largest shareholder is positively 
44 
 
associated with payout ratio. In Model (2) we regress payout ratio on Vote1 and Vote2 as well 
as other control variables including fixed effects. The results suggest that after controlling for 
other firm characteristics the shift in power towards the second largest shareholder is playing a 
positive role in firm’s dividend policy. This implies that the second largest shareholder with an 
increase in its controlling power promotes a higher dividends payout ratio policy which to some 
extent mitigates agency problems and information asymmetry between the dominant shareholder 
and minority shareholders. In Model (3) we regress payout ratio on Vote2 and Excess1 which 
captures the change of the excess control of the largest shareholder and other control variables. 
The coefficient is still significantly positive for Vote2, indicating that in firms featuring a 
largest shareholder, one standard deviation increase in the voting power of the second largest 
shareholder is associated with 17.891*0.001=0.018 increase in dividends payout ratio. However, 
no significant results are found for the dominant shareholder. Overall, regarding to the results of 
the full sample, we find a significantly positive relationship between the change in power of the 
second largest shareholder and dividends payout ratio.  
In order to address the endogeneity issues, Model (4) presents the regression of payout ratio on 
Vote1 and Vote2 with subsample of 2008-2010 to examine the role of the change in voting 
rights of the second largest shareholder on firm’s future dividends policies. Vote2 is 
significantly positive at 1% level, suggesting that one standard deviation increase in the voting 
rights of the second largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 leads to 0.004*17.891=0.072 increase 
in dividends payout ratio in the future. In Model (5) we add other control variables and the 
coefficient for Vote2 is still significantly positive at 1% level. The results are also consistent 
with previous studies which document that the second largest shareholder who compete for more 
control and monitor the dominant shareholder tend to support firm policies, say higher dividends 
payout ratio, that favour small shareholders which in turn improve corporate governance and 
firm performance (Faccio et al., 2001; Pagano and Rӧell, 1998; Bloch and Hege, 2001). In 
Model (6) we regress payout ratio on Vote2 and Excess1 and other control variables. The 
testing results for Vote2 are still significantly positive at 1%, confirming the positive role of 
MLS on firm’s dividends payout policies. In Model (7) to (9) we use the industry-country 
average change in power of the second large shareholder as the proxy of the shift in power away 
from the dominant shareholder to help alleviate endogeneity concern embedded in the tests. We 
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find that when we use industry-country average of Vote1 and industry-country average of 
Vote2 as the only testing variables without other control variables, industry-country average of 
Vote2 is significantly positively associated with dividends payout ratio, which supports our 
previous findings about the effective internal governance role of MLS. On the other hand, we do 
not find significant effect of industry-country average of Vote2 for Model (8) and (9) when 
adding other control variables.  
In a brief conclusion, based on our testing results we find that an increase in power of the second 
largest shareholder is positively associated with dividends payout ratio, which is consistent with 
previous studies in two ways. First, the second largest shareholder with a gain in his/her 
controlling power can mitigate agency problems and information asymmetry through supporting 
beneficial policies that favour small shareholders which in turn increase firm performance. 
Second, dividend is a very expensive signal for future earnings and firms featuring MLS have 
more confidence for their futures so that they can pay higher dividends to convey information 
about their better future earnings.  
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6. Robustness Tests 
We explore whether our results remain reliable in different extensive sensitivity tests. 
Specifically, we test whether our results are sensitive to different measurements of the change of 
voting rights of shareholders, different time periods of study, enlarged samples consist of MLS-
SLS firms, industry-country average change in voting power of the second largest shareholder 
with the sample of firms that exist in both 1996 and 2008, and change of relative power as the 
test variable. 
6.1 Different Measurements Regarding the Change of Voting Rights of Shareholders 
In our main tests, we use the change of the voting rights of the largest and second largest 
shareholders. Actually, the same percentage point change in the voting power of the second 
largest shareholders who have different level of control powers in 1996 can have significantly 
different impact on firm value, operating performance and capital structure. For instance, the 
effect of the change of the second largest shareholder can be different between the change from 
12% to 22% and the change from 32% to 42%, which both have 10% change of voting rights. 
Therefore, we use the percentage change of the voting rights of shareholders to better capture the 
impact of the change in power of the second largest shareholder. Specifically, the percentage 
change of ownership structure is the difference of voting rights shareholders between 1996 and 
2008 divided by the voting rights of shareholders in 1996. We run the same regressions and find 
that our results are robust to the percentage change of the voting rights of MLS.  
6.2 Different Time Periods of Sample  
In our main regressions, we use our whole sample from 1996 to 2010 to test the effect of the 
change in power of the second largest shareholder on firm value and other characteristics. In 
order to partially solve the endogeneity issues we also use a subsample from 2008 to 2010. Both 
samples suggest a positive internal governance role of MLS. We would like to examine whether 
our results are stable when we use a different time period of sample. Therefore, we use a 
subsample from 1996 to 2008 to test the change in power of the second largest shareholder on 
firm valuation, operating performance and capital structure. The results show that when we use 
1996-2008 as the subsample, the increase in power of the second largest shareholder still has a 
positive impact on firm-level governance and mitigates agency problems.  
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6.3 Testing with Enlarged Samples Consist of MLS-SLS Firms 
In our main samples, we only consider firms that have MLS in 2008 because Carney and Child 
(2012) only record large shareholders with voting rights of at least 10%. Therefore, our main 
samples contain SLS-MLS, and MLS-MLS firms. In this section we intend to enlarge our sample 
size by including firms that feature MLS in 1996 but turn into SLS in 2008. By including MLS-
SLS firms, we are actually investigating whether such type of firms performs worse or their firm 
values decrease when they change from MLS to SLS. In order to include this type of firms, we 
replace the voting rights of the second largest shareholder with 0 if they are missing, provided 
that the firms are MLS in 1996 and SLS in 2008. After we enlarge our samples to include a third 
type of firms, we replicate the regressions for the full sample period of 1996-2010 and subsample 
periods of 1996-2008 and 2008-2010. For the full sample of 1996-2010 and subsample of 1996-
2008, we find consistent and significant results for Vote2, indicating that the increase of 
controlling power of the second largest shareholder play a positive role in mitigating agency 
problems and increasing firm value. Our results for subsample period of 2008-2010 are 
consistent but not as significant as our full samples are. However, since our enlarged samples are 
merely a approximation for the voting rights of the second largest shareholder in 2008, the 
insignificance of our results might be affected by this approximation.   
6.4 Industry-Country Average Change in Voting Power of the Second Largest Shareholder with 
the Sample of Firms that Exist in Both 1996 and 2008 
In our main tests, we use industry-country average change in the voting rights of the second large 
shareholder as the test variable to address endogeneity issues with an enlarged sample consist of 
firms that might or might not exist in both 1996 and 2008, i.e. the firms might exist in either 
1996 or 2008 or both years. In this section, we use a different sample that consists of firms which 
exist in both 1996 and 2008 to test whether our main results still hold.  
We use industry-country average change in the voting rights of the second large shareholder 
(industry-country average ∆Vote2) as the test variable to test whether it has a significant impact 
on firm value and operating performance for firms that exist in both 1996 and 2008. Table 13 
presents the multivariate regression results. We find that for Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE and Long 
term debt, the results remain the same since industry-country average ∆Vote2 is significantly and 
positively associated with Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE and Long term debt. Meanwhile, the results for 
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Short term debt are only significant for Model (10) and Model (12). However, the results for 
Inventory and Dividends payout ratio are consistent but not significant. 
6.5 Change of Relative Power as the Test Variable 
In our main tests, we use the change in voting power of the second large shareholder as the main 
test variable. We consider an increase in voting power of the second large shareholder weakens 
the controlling power of the largest shareholder. In this section we use the change in relative 
power of the second large shareholder as the test variable to investigate how the change in 
relative power of the second large shareholder compared to the largest shareholder affects firm 
valuation and operating performance. Specifically, we define the change in relative power as the 
change of the ratio of Vote2 to Vote1 from 1996 to 2008. Table 14 presents the testing results of 
the change in relative power.  
We find that Change of Relative Power is significantly and positively associated with Tobin’s Q 
without controlling for other firm specific variables. However, it becomes insignificant after 
adding other firm characteristics although the sign remains positive. The results for ROA and 
ROE remain the same, suggesting that the change in relative power of the second large 
shareholder has a positive impact on operating performance. We do not find significant results 
for Short term debt although the results remain negative. However, significant and positive 
results are found for Long term debt, which indicates that an increase in the relative power of the 
second large shareholder leads to a better access to long term debt financing. Similar to what we 
find for Tobin’s Q, when testing for Dividends payout ratio the coefficient of change in relative 
power becomes insignificant after we control for other firm specific variables. The results for 
Inventory remain significant and negative, consistent with the main results, suggesting that an 
increase in change of the relative power is associated with more efficient operation management. 
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7. Conclusion 
This thesis examines the effect of the evolution of ownership structure on corporate strategies, 
and corporate financial and operating performance. In particular, we study whether the 
empowerment of the second largest shareholder, accordingly impediments to the exercise of the 
power of the dominant shareholder mitigates agency problems and reduces expropriation of 
minority investors that often fulfills sole interests of the dominant shareholder. More specific 
goal of the thesis is to uncover whether the shift in power away from the dominant shareholder 
towards the second largest shareholder plays an effective governance role, and thereby positively 
affecting firm valuation and operating performance. Furthermore, different from previous 
studies, we explore important channels through which the increase in power of the second largest 
shareholder affect firm value and performance, including the firm’s financing policies and access 
to finance, a more effective operation management, and a higher dividend payout ratio.  
First, we find that the increase in the voting rights of the second largest shareholder from 1996 to 
2008 has a strong and positive impact on firm valuation (Tobin’s Q) and operating performance 
(ROA and ROE), which suggests that an increase in power of the second largest shareholder 
helps mitigate agency problems between the controlling owner and minority shareholders. This 
finding is consistent with the majority of literature that shows a positive relationship between 
MLS and firm value and performance (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Gutiérrez and Tribó, 2004; 
Attig et al., 2009). Second, we explore possible channels through which the increase in power of 
the second largest shareholder can mitigate agency problems and improve firm performance and 
valuation. In that, first, we find that the shift in power towards the second largest shareholder is 
associated with a higher reliance on long term debt as opposed to short term debt financing, 
suggesting a better access to long term financing. We interpret this finding as an evidence that 
the increase in the power of the second large shareholder helps mitigate agency problems 
between the controlling shareholder and the debt holders (financiers), thus making it possible to 
access lower interest long term debt perhaps from a broader group of financiers (both bank and 
public). This finding is consistent with previous literature that shows the existence and the power 
of MLS associated with lower cost of capital (Attig et al., 2008). Also, this finding is consistent 
with Lin et al. (2013) which suggest that firms with less monitoring needs or less agency 
problems should borrow more from public investors which typically have longer debt maturity 
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than bank debt. Second, we find that an increase in power of the second largest shareholder is 
associated with a decrease in proportion of inventory in the balanced sheet, an indicator of 
improved operational efficiency. The finding is consistent with literatures which suggest that a 
lower inventory can serve as a channel which leads to a higher firm value and better performance 
(Bryant et al., 2004; McNaughton et al., 2001). Finally, we show that firms featuring an increase 
in power of the second largest shareholder pay higher dividends. This evidence is consistent with 
literature in two ways. First, firms which pay higher dividends generally have a better 
perspective about their future earnings and firm value, which is consistent with our finding about 
the role of the increase in power of the second largest shareholder in mitigating agency problems 
and enhancing firm value. Second, MLS who compete for control can promote policies that are 
beneficial to small shareholders, say a higher dividends payout policy (reducing possibility of 
agency cost of free cash flow, such as empire building), to attract their votes, which leads to an 
increase in firm valuation.  
This thesis contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we complement the existing 
empirical literature regarding the internal governance role of MLS by showing positive firm 
value implications of the empowerment of the second large shareholder. Second, this thesis is the 
first to test the effect of evolution of voting power of the second largest shareholder on firm 
value and operating performance. Specifically, we discover several channels through which MLS 
affect firm value and performance, including better access to long term finance, improving 
operation efficiency as evidence in lower inventory ratio, and supporting distribution policies 
that put more cash in the hands of shareholders (i.e. higher dividends).  
Our results are robust to corrections to some endogeneity issues in multiple ways as we describe 
in section 5, yet, there are limitations that our findings should be taken cautiously. In particular, 
our dataset lacks the time series of ownership structures, which precludes us from testing the 
effect of the change of voting rights of shareholders on an annual basis. This also precludes us to 
use some powerful dynamic panel tests to mitigate omitted variable problems more effectively. 
Future research has an opportunity to reproduce ownership data consistent with Claessens et al. 
(2000) for several years to allow advancing future research in this line. 
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Appendix:    A Detailed Definitions of Key Variables 
Variable Names Definitions Source 
Main Dependent Variables 
Firm Valuation      
Tobin's Q 
The market value of equity plus the book value of total assets 
minus the book value of equity, then all divided by the book value 
of total assets. 
WorldScope Database, 
Author's estimation 
Operating Performance 
  
ROA net income divided by total assets*100 
WorldScope Database, 
Author's estimation 
ROE Net income divided by shareholder's equity*100 
WorldScope Database, 
Author's estimation 
Capital Structure 
  
Ldebt the ratio of a firm’s long term debt to its total debt 
WorldScope Database, 
Author's estimation 
Sdebt the ratio of a firm’s short term debt to its total debt 
WorldScope Database, 
Author's estimation 
Operation Management 
 
  
Inventory Total inventories divided by total assets*100 
WorldScope Database, 
Author's estimation 
Dividend Policy   
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Dividends Payout Ratio Dividends Per Share / Earnings Per Share 
WorldScope Database, 
Author's estimation 
Main Independent Variables 
Ownership Structure Variables    
MLS 
Equals to 1 if there is at least one second largest 
shareholder with voting rights of at least 10% besides the 
largest shareholder, and 0 otherwise. 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
SLS 
Equals to 1 if there is only one large shareholder with 
voting rights of at least 10%, and 0 otherwise. 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
WH 
Equals to 1 if there is no large shareholder with voting 
rights of at least 10%, and 0 otherwise. 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
Vote1 
the change of the voting rights of the largest shareholder 
from 1996 to 2008 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
Vote2 
the change of the voting rights of the second largest 
shareholder from 1996 to 2008 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010) 
Excess1 
the change of the excess control of the largest 
shareholder from 1996 to 2008 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010) 
Percent Vote1 
the percentage change of the voting rights of the largest 
shareholder from 1996 to 2008 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
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Percent Vote2 
the percentage change of the voting rights of the second 
largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
Percent Excess1 
The percentage change of the excess control of the 
largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
Industry-Country Average of Vote1 
Industry-Country average change of the voting rights of 
the largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
Industry-Country Average of Vote2 
Industry-Country average change of the voting rights of 
the second largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
Industry-Country Average of Excess1 
Industry-Country average change of the excess control of 
the largest shareholder from 1996 to 2008 
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
Change of Relative Power 
Change of the ratio of voting rights of the second largest 
shareholder to voting rights of the largest shareholder 
from 1996 to 2008  
Claessens et al. (2000), Carney 
and Child (2010), author's 
estimation 
Control Variables     
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Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
WorldScope Database, Author's 
estimation 
Leverage the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
WorldScope Database, Author's 
estimation 
Sales Growth 
(Current Year's Net Sales or Revenues / Last Year's 
Total Net Sales or Revenues - 1) * 100 
WorldScope Database, Author's 
estimation 
Capital Expenditure Capital Expenditures / Average Total Assets * 100 
WorldScope Database, Author's 
estimation 
Note: In order to avoid outliers from dragging our results, we winsorize the dependent variables and all the independent control variables at 1th percentile 
and 99th percentile, including Tobin's Q, ROA, ROE, Ldebt, Sdebt, inventory, dividends payout ratio, firm size, leverage, sales growth, and capital 
expenditure. For firm size, leverage, sales growth, and capital expenditure, we use lagged values instead of contemporaneous values to control for the 
impact of previous values on current dependent variables. Finally, apart from the above control variables, we also add year, industry, and country dummy 
variables in order to control for year, industry, and country fixed effects. 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Q1 Median Q3 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Tobin’s Q 5679 1.226 0.636 0.890 1.059 1.342 
ROA 5649 5.064 7.079 1.800 4.290 8.090 
ROE 5658 6.895 9.744 2.850 6.130 10.690 
Ldebt 5380 0.524 0.316 0.271 0.571 0.791 
Sdebt 5303 0.484 0.313 0.216 0.438 0.739 
Payoutratio 5719 0.257 0.256 0.000 0.208 0.417 
Inventory 5105 10.799 11.191 2.449 8.022 15.122 
Panel B: Ownership Structure Variables 
Vote1 5719 6.609 22.488 -8.480 4.150 21.590 
Vote2 852 13.740 17.891 5.000 10.980 20.800 
Excess1 5719 0.296 10.201 -3.860 0.000 0.030 
Panel C: Control Variables 
Lagged Size 5691 14.184 1.925 12.754 13.996 15.668 
Lagged Leverage 5659 0.270 0.211 0.087 0.247 0.409 
Lagged Sales Growth 5267 0.113 0.341 -0.032 0.067 0.191 
Lagged Capital Expenditure 5102 0.058 0.071 0.010 0.035 0.078 
The table presents the summary descriptive statistics for dependent variables, ownership structure variables, and control variables. The 
sample includes firms from 9 East Asian countries assembled in Claessens et al. (2000) and Carney and Child (2012). 
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Table 2 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variables 
T
o
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’s Q
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
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. 
E
x
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Tobin’s Q 1 
             
ROA 0.35 1 
            
ROE 0.32 0.94 1 
           
Ldebt -0.02 0.00 -0.05 1 
          
Sdebt 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -1.00 1 
         
Payoutratio 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.00 -0.01 1 
        
Inventory -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.20 0.23 -0.05 1 
       
Vote1 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 1 
      
Vote2 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.12 -0.05 0.20 -0.16 0.30 1 
     
Excess1 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.26 1 
    
Lagged Size -0.02 -0.17 -0.12 0.22 -0.24 0.08 -0.15 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 1 
   
Lagged Leverage -0.06 -0.16 -0.21 0.21 -0.23 -0.21 0.00 -0.11 -0.28 -0.14 0.12 1 
  
Lagged Sales Growth 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.03 1 
 
Lagged Cap. Expenditure 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.11 -0.12 -0.04 -0.10 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.13 0.20 1 
N 5679 5649 5658 5380 5303 5719 5105 5719 852 5719 5691 5659 5267 5102 
The table presents the pairwise correlation coefficients of our key variables. The sample includes firms from 9 East Asian countries assembled in 
Claessens et al. (2000) and Carney and Child (2012). 
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Table 3 
Summary of The Number of Firms by Year and Country 
  
Exist in both 1996  
and 2008 
Exist only in 1996 Exist only in 2008 Subtotal 
Hong Kong 74 147 63 284 
% of total 2.75 5.46 2.34 10.54 
Indonesia 46 61 65 172 
% of total 1.71 2.26 2.41 6.38 
Japan 69 810 63 942 
% of total 2.56 30.07 2.34 34.97 
Malaysia 33 109 114 256 
% of total 1.22 4.05 4.23 9.50 
Philippines 40 35 60 135 
% of total 1.48 1.30 2.23 5.01 
Singapore 38 95 77 210 
% of total 1.41 3.53 2.86 7.80 
South Korea 47 127 85 259 
% of total 1.78 4.71 3.16 9.65 
Taiwan 24 86 133 243 
% of total 0.89 3.19 4.94 9.02 
Thailand 33 60 99 192 
% of total 1.22 2.23 3.67 7.13 
Subtotal  403 1531 759 2693 
% of total 15.03 56.79 28.17 100 
This table presents the summary of the number of firms by country and year. The columns are the number of firms that 
exist in both 1996 and 2008, only exist in 1996 and only exist in 2008 by country, respectively. The last column depicts 
the total number of firms for each country in our full sample.  
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Table 4 
The Change of The Ownership Structures of The Sample by Year and Country 
 
SLS 
 
MLS 
 
WH 
  1996 2008 Change Change%   1996 2008 Change Change%   1996 2008 Change Change% 
Hong Kong 157 101 -56 -35.67 
 
64 27 -37 -57.81 
 
0 9 9 - 
% of total 8.11 8.68 
  
 
3.31 2.32 
  
 
0 0.77 
  
Indonesia 53 74 21 39.62 
 
53 32 -21 -39.62 
 
1 5 4 400.00 
% of total 2.74 6.36 
  
 
2.74 2.75 
  
 
0.05 0.43 
  
Japan 442 45 -397 -89.82 
 
61 10 -51 -83.61 
 
376 76 -300 -79.79 
% of total 22.84 3.87 
  
 
3.15 0.86 
  
 
19.43 6.53 
  
Malaysia 60 113 53 88.33 
 
81 30 -51 -62.96 
 
1 4 3 300.00 
% of total 3.10 9.71 
  
 
4.19 2.58 
  
 
0.05 0.34 
  
Philippines 30 65 35 116.67 
 
44 33 -11 -25.00 
 
1 2 1 100.00 
% of total 1.55 5.58 
  
 
2.27 2.84 
  
 
0.05 0.17 
  
Singapore 47 82 35 74.47 
 
83 23 -60 -72.29 
 
3 10 7 233.33 
% of total 2.43 7.04 
  
 
4.29 1.98 
  
 
0.16 0.86 
  
South Korea 105 93 -12 -11.43 
 
40 4 -36 -90.00 
 
30 36 6 20.00 
% of total 5.43 7.99 
  
 
2.07 0.34 
  
 
1.55 3.09 
  
Taiwan 50 60 10 20.00 
 
55 8 -47 -85.45 
 
5 89 84 1680.00 
% of total 2.58 5.15 
  
 
2.84 0.69 
  
 
0.26 7.65 
  
Thailand 12 64 52 433.33 
 
80 29 -51 -63.75 
 
1 39 38 3800.00 
% of total 0.62 5.50 
  
 
4.13 2.49 
  
 
0.05 3.35 
  
Subtotal  956 697 -259 -27.09 
 
561 196 -365 -65.06 
 
418 270 -148 -35.41 
% of total 49.41 59.88       28.99 16.84       21.60 23.20     
The table presents the change of the number of firms for each type of ownership structure from 1996 to 2008 by country. For example, in 1996 
Hong Kong has 157 firms featuring SLS and in 2008 it has 101 SLS firms and the percentage change is -35.67%. The firms do not have to exist in 
both 1996 and 2008. There are supposed to be overlaps between some categories because firms might change their ownership structures over time.
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Table 5 
The Change of Ownership Structures of The Companies That Exist in Both 1996 and 2008 by Country 
Ownership Structure in 1996 SLS 
 
MLS 
 
WH 
 Subtotal 
Ownership Structure in 2008 SLS MLS WH   SLS MLS WH   SLS MLS WH   
Hong Kong 46 7 2 
 
11 7 1 
 
0 0 0 
 
74 
% of total 11.39 1.73 0.50 
 
2.72 1.73 0.25 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
Indonesia 18 4 3 
 
15 5 1 
 
0 0 0 
 
46 
% of total 4.46 0.99 0.74 
 
3.71 1.24 0.25 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
Japan 12 1 17 
 
0 0 0 
 
3 1 34 
 
68 
% of total 2.97 0.25 4.21 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.74 0.25 8.42 
  
Malaysia 11 3 0 
 
13 5 1 
 
0 0 0 
 
33 
% of total 2.72 0.74 0.00 
 
3.22 1.24 0.25 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
Philippines 15 5 0 
 
11 8 0 
 
0 1 0 
 
40 
% of total 3.71 1.24 0.00 
 
2.72 1.98 0.00 
 
0.00 0.25 0.00 
  
Singapore 9 3 0 
 
21 2 1 
 
2 0 0 
 
38 
% of total 2.23 0.74 0.00 
 
5.20 0.50 0.25 
 
0.50 0.00 0.00 
  
South Korea 23 1 5 
 
8 0 2 
 
5 0 3 
 
47 
% of total 5.69 0.25 1.24 
 
1.98 0.00 0.50 
 
1.24 0.00 0.74 
  
Taiwan 5 1 5 
 
6 0 6 
 
1 0 0 
 
24 
% of total 1.24 0.25 1.24 
 
1.49 0.00 1.49 
 
0.25 0.00 0.00 
  
Thailand 2 0 3 
 
16 6 6 
 
0 0 0 
 
33 
% of total 0.50 0.00 0.74 
 
3.96 1.49 1.49 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
Subtotal  141 25 35 
 
101 33 18 
 
11 2 37 
 
403 
% of total 34.90 6.44 8.66   25.00 8.17 4.46   2.72 0.50 9.16   100.00 
The table presents the number of firms for each category of ownership structure changes for firms that exist in both 1996 and 2008 by country. 
We divide the firms into nine categories: firms that remain SLS over time (SLS-SLS), firms that change from SLS to MLS (SLS-MLS), firms 
that change from SLS to widely-held (WH) (SLS-WH), firms that change from MLS to SLS (MLS-SLS), firms that remain MLS from 1996 to 
2008 (MLS-MLS), firms that become WH from MLS (MLS-WH), firms that change from WH to SLS (WH-SLS), firms that change from WH 
to MLS (WH-MLS), and firms that remain WH over time (WH-WH). For example, for Hong Kong there is 46 firms that remain SLS over time 
7 that change from SLS to MLS and there is no firms that change from WH to SLS.   
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Table 6 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Firm Valuation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Vote1 -0.006*** -0.000 
 
-0.004 0.007 
    
 
(-3.02) (-0.13) 
 
(-0.83) (1.32) 
    
Vote2 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
   
 
(7.18) (2.83) (2.80) (2.70) (2.79) (2.94) 
   
Excess1
  
0.002 
  
0.012** 
   
   
(1.07) 
  
(2.36) 
   
Industry-Country 
Average of Vote1       
0.004*** 0.001 
 
       
(3.23) (0.84) 
 
Industry-Country 
Average of Vote2       
0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
       
(6.00) (3.21) (4.12) 
Industry-Country 
Average of 
Excess1 
        
0.001 
         
(1.08) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
-0.006 0.003 
 
0.308*** 0.315*** 
 
0.008* 0.008** 
  
(-0.35) (0.21) 
 
(4.55) (5.04) 
 
(1.65) (2.06) 
Lag Leverage 
 
0.218** 0.215** 
 
-1.398*** -1.099** 
 
0.096** 0.098*** 
  
(2.52) (2.49) 
 
(-2.79) (-2.33) 
 
(2.25) (3.57) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
-0.012 -0.013 
 
-0.145 -0.165 
 
-0.024 -0.024* 
  
(-0.29) (-0.31) 
 
(-1.00) (-1.16) 
 
(-1.35) (-1.75) 
Lag Capital 
Expenditure  
-0.385* -0.381* 
 
2.008 1.623 
 
-0.127 -0.126 
  
(-1.68) (-1.66) 
 
(1.60) (1.31) 
 
(-1.11) (-1.45) 
Lag Tobin's Q§ 
 
0.752*** 0.751*** 
 
0.211** 0.200** 
 
0.767*** 0.767*** 
  
(30.61) (30.60) 
 
(2.58) (2.49) 
 
(34.01) (86.26) 
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Constant 0.903*** -0.103 -0.212 0.741* -1.857* -2.359** 1.642*** -0.209* -0.178 
 
(4.94) (-0.38) (-0.73) (1.89) (-1.96) (-2.44) (15.79) (-1.66) (-1.58) 
Observations 849 751 751 168 156 156 5152 4378 4378 
R-squared 0.382 0.745 0.745 0.555 0.652 0.663 0.139 0.685 0.685 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between the change in voting rights of the second largest shareholder and firm valuation. Model (1)-(3) are 
the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. Model (4)-(6) are the subsample period from 2008-2010. Model (7)-(9) are the full sample with 
the industry-country average change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder as the test variable.§: In Model (1) to (3) lag Tobin’s 
Q is lagged one period of Tobin’s Q, while in Model (4) to (6) lag Tobin’s Q is the change of Tobin’s Q from 1996 to 2008. T-statistics are 
included in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Operating Performance (ROA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Vote1 -0.015 -0.021 
 
0.029 0.120*** 
    
 
(-0.67) (-0.88) 
 
(0.65) (2.82) 
    
Vote2 0.090*** 0.056*** 0.052*** 0.094** 0.102*** 0.118*** 
   
 
(4.69) (2.87) (2.74) (2.54) (3.32) (3.88) 
   
Excess1
  
-0.003 
  
0.093** 
   
   
(-0.10) 
  
(2.15) 
   
Industry-Country Average 
 of Vote1       
-0.045*** -0.028 
 
       
(-3.11) (-1.55) 
 
Industry-Country Average  
of Vote2       
0.035*** 0.018*** 0.014** 
       
(4.95) (2.73) (2.15) 
Industry-Country Average  
of Excess1         
0.016 
         
(0.76) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
-0.318 -0.241 
 
2.623*** 2.263*** 
 
0.174** 0.197** 
  
(-1.08) (-0.78) 
 
(4.55) (4.13) 
 
(2.00) (2.55) 
Lag Leverage 
 
-1.417 -1.531 
 
-17.112*** -12.564*** 
 
-2.575*** -2.474*** 
  
(-0.87) (-0.94) 
 
(-3.93) (-2.99) 
 
(-3.30) (-4.39) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
0.888 0.891 
 
-0.568 -0.732 
 
0.754** 0.761*** 
  
(1.20) (1.20) 
 
(-0.46) (-0.59) 
 
(2.20) (2.74) 
Lag Capital Expenditure 
 
-1.412 -1.189 
 
27.876** 22.036** 
 
0.806 0.947 
  
(-0.34) (-0.29) 
 
(2.61) (2.02) 
 
(0.36) (0.55) 
Lag ROA 
 
0.397*** 0.397*** 
 
0.427*** 0.428*** 
 
0.393*** 0.394*** 
  
(10.78) (10.75) 
 
(8.02) (7.94) 
 
(14.02) (25.93) 
Constant 4.701 8.066 8.137 3.769 -20.884** -23.689*** 9.332*** 0.357 0.212 
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(1.29) (1.63) (1.54) (0.55) (-2.58) (-2.77) (4.43) (0.15) (0.09) 
Observations 839 750 750 165 160 160 5117 4414 4414 
R-squared 0.287 0.419 0.418 0.598 0.779 0.773 0.112 0.265 0.265 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between the change in voting rights of the second largest shareholder and operating performance (ROA). Model 
(1)-(3) are the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. Model (4)-(6) are the subsample period from 2008-2010. Model (7)-(9) are the full sample 
with the industry-country average change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder as the test variable.§: In Model (1) to (3) lag ROA 
is lagged one period of ROA, while in Model (4) to (6) lag ROA is the change of ROA  from 1996 to 2008. T-statistics are included in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
  
 
7
0
 
Table 8 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Operating Performance (ROE) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
Vote1 -0.018 -0.032 
 
0.031 0.144** 
    
 
(-0.59) (-0.99) 
 
(0.52) (2.58) 
    
Vote2 0.146*** 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.129*** 0.138*** 0.160*** 
   
 
(5.68) (3.28) (3.15) (2.72) (3.42) (4.08) 
   
Excess1
  
-0.011 
  
0.104* 
   
   
(-0.32) 
  
(1.86) 
   
Industry-Country Average 
of Vote1       
-0.067*** -0.057*** 
 
       
(-3.34) (-2.84) 
 
Industry-Country Average  
of Vote2       
0.060*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 
       
(6.18) (3.27) (2.63) 
Industry-Country Average  
of Excess1         
0.008 
         
(0.29) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
-0.302 -0.226 
 
3.279*** 2.847*** 
 
0.277*** 0.312*** 
  
(-0.77) (-0.55) 
 
(4.37) (3.96) 
 
(2.62) (2.94) 
Lag Leverage 
 
-2.999 -3.149 
 
-22.257*** -17.243*** 
 
-4.607*** -4.447*** 
  
(-1.37) (-1.44) 
 
(-3.91) (-3.13) 
 
(-5.88) (-5.65) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
0.929 0.934 
 
-0.600 -0.823 
 
1.012*** 1.025*** 
  
(0.94) (0.94) 
 
(-0.37) (-0.51) 
 
(2.66) (2.69) 
Lag Capital Expenditure 
 
-1.308 -0.993 
 
38.030*** 32.311** 
 
0.651 0.84 
  
(-0.24) (-0.18) 
 
(2.72) (2.27) 
 
(0.28) (0.36) 
Lag ROE 
 
0.402*** 0.402*** 
 
0.440*** 0.440*** 
 
0.436*** 0.438*** 
  
(11.03) (11.01) 
 
(8.22) (8.13) 
 
(28.89) (29.00) 
Constant 2.894 2.782 4.248 4.703 -25.807** -29.103** 12.895*** -0.389 -1.084 
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(0.95) (0.42) (0.76) (0.52) (-2.44) (-2.59) (4.44) (-0.13) (-0.35) 
Observations 846 749 749 168 160 160 5102 4386 4386 
R-squared 0.268 0.416 0.416 0.59 0.78 0.775 0.1 0.291 0.289 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between the change in voting rights of the second largest shareholder and operating performance (ROE). 
Model (1)-(3) are the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. Model (4)-(6) are the subsample period from 2008-2010. Model (7)-(9) are the full 
sample with the industry-country average change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder as the test variable.§: In Model (1) to (3) 
lag ROE is lagged one period of ROE, while in Model (4) to (6) lag ROE is the change of ROE  from 1996 to 2008. T-statistics are included in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Capital Structure (Long Term Debt) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Ldebt Ldebt Ldebt Ldebt Ldebt Ldebt Ldebt Ldebt Ldebt 
Vote1 0.001 0.000 
 
0.001 0.001 
    
 
(0.72) (0.48) 
 
(0.25) (0.76) 
    
Vote2 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.009*** 
   
 
(5.19) (3.55) (3.67) (0.18) (3.86) (3.96) 
   
Excess1
  
0.001 
  
0.002 
   
   
(1.01) 
  
(0.98) 
   
Industry-Country Average  
of Vote1       
-0.000 0.000 
 
       
(-0.77) (0.10) 
 
Industry-Country Average  
of Vote2       
0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 
       
(5.50) (2.36) (2.38) 
Industry-Country Average  
of Excess1         
-0.001 
         
(-0.94) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
0.023** 0.025** 
 
0.137*** 0.136*** 
 
0.016*** 0.016*** 
  
(1.97) (2.14) 
 
(5.16) (5.37) 
 
(6.16) (6.06) 
Lag Leverage 
 
0.039 0.043 
 
-0.018 0.068 
 
0.081*** 0.079*** 
  
(0.61) (0.67) 
 
(-0.10) (0.40) 
 
(4.24) (4.15) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
0.021 0.02 
 
0.096* 0.094* 
 
0.021** 0.021** 
  
(0.72) (0.71) 
 
(1.84) (1.80) 
 
(2.20) (2.18) 
Lag Capital Expenditure 
 
0.077 0.073 
 
1.499*** 1.411*** 
 
0.176*** 0.175*** 
  
(0.51) (0.48) 
 
(3.01) (2.82) 
 
(3.01) (2.98) 
Lag Long Term Debt 
 
0.522*** 0.521*** 
 
0.485*** 0.490*** 
 
0.654*** 0.653*** 
  
(14.63) (14.57) 
 
(7.70) (7.77) 
 
(54.76) (54.75) 
Constant 0.162* -0.316 -0.374* 0.438** -2.025*** -0.51 0.612*** -0.182** -0.171* 
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(1.78) (-1.63) (-1.88) (2.26) (-4.80) (-1.59) (6.98) (-2.03) (-1.92) 
Observations 736 658 658 147 139 139 4820 4090 4090 
R-squared 0.375 0.552 0.553 0.392 0.757 0.758 0.13 0.543 0.544 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between the change in voting rights of the second largest shareholder and Capital Structure (Long Term Debt). 
Model (1)-(3) are the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. Model (4)-(6) are the subsample period from 2008-2010. Model (7)-(9) are the full 
sample with the industry-country average change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder as the test variable.§: In Model (1) to (3) 
lag Long Term Debt is lagged one period of Long Term Debt, while in Model (4) to (6) lag Long Term Debt is the change of Long Term Debt  
from 1996 to 2008. T-statistics are included in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Capital Structure (Short Term Debt) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Sdebt Sdebt Sdebt Sdebt Sdebt Sdebt Sdebt Sdebt Sdebt 
Vote1 -0.001 -0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.002 
    
 
(-0.78) (-0.46) 
 
(-0.17) (-0.96) 
    
Vote2 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000 -0.007*** -0.008*** 
   
 
(-3.51) (-2.71) (-2.77) (0.01) (-3.53) (-3.61) 
   
Excess1
  
-0.001 
  
-0.002 
   
   
(-0.73) 
  
(-0.88) 
   
Industry-Country Average  
of Vote1       
0.001** 0.000 
 
       
(2.03) (0.51) 
 
Industry-Country Average  
of Vote2       
-0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** 
       
(-5.31) (-2.30) (-2.22) 
Industry-Country Average  
of Excess1         
0.001 
         
(0.94) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
-0.024** -0.026** 
 
-0.141*** -0.137*** 
 
-0.017*** -0.017*** 
  
(-2.07) (-2.14) 
 
(-5.40) (-5.50) 
 
(-6.35) (-6.31) 
Lag Leverage 
 
-0.016 -0.019 
 
0.014 -0.078 
 
-0.091*** -0.090*** 
  
(-0.25) (-0.30) 
 
(0.08) (-0.46) 
 
(-4.75) (-4.69) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
-0.015 -0.014 
 
-0.123** -0.117** 
 
-0.020** -0.020** 
  
(-0.50) (-0.46) 
 
(-2.32) (-2.24) 
 
(-2.14) (-2.13) 
Lag Capital Expenditure 
 
-0.087 -0.085 
 
-1.458*** -1.378*** 
 
-0.184*** -0.183*** 
  
(-0.58) (-0.56) 
 
(-2.97) (-2.78) 
 
(-3.13) (-3.11) 
Lag Short Term Debt 
 
0.532*** 0.531*** 
 
0.491*** 0.494*** 
 
0.644*** 0.643*** 
  
(14.70) (14.69) 
 
(7.78) (7.82) 
 
(52.83) (52.82) 
Constant 0.839*** 0.577*** 0.677*** 1.059*** 2.287*** 2.342*** 0.400*** 0.543*** 0.539*** 
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(9.13) (3.02) (3.87) (4.99) (6.43) (6.39) (4.61) (5.98) (5.95) 
Observations 715 638 638 145 137 137 4747 4012 4012 
R-squared 0.336 0.534 0.534 0.381 0.765 0.765 0.123 0.533 0.533 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between the change in voting rights of the second largest shareholder and Capital Structure (Short Term Debt). 
Model (1)-(3) are the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. Model (4)-(6) are the subsample period from 2008-2010. Model (7)-(9) are the full 
sample with the industry-country average change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder as the test variable.§: In Model (1) to (3) 
lag Short Term Debt is lagged one period of Short Term Debt, while in Model (4) to (6) lag Short Term Debt is the change of Short Term Debt  
from 1996 to 2008. T-statistics are included in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 11 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Operation Management 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Inventory Inventory Inventory Inventory Inventory Inventory Inventory Inventory Inventory 
Vote1 0.145*** 0.023* 
 
0.097** 0.142*** 
 
    
 
 
(6.67) (1.70) 
 
(2.12) (2.78) 
    
Vote2 -0.152*** -0.028*** -0.022** -0.154*** -0.203*** -0.163*** 
   
 
(-8.70) (-2.59) (-2.12) (-4.19) (-5.61) (-4.60) 
   
Excess1
  
-0.005 
  
-0.123** 
   
   
(-0.36) 
  
(-2.47) 
   
Industry-Country Average  
of Vote1       
-0.113*** -0.015 
 
       
(-4.45) (-1.24) 
 
Industry-Country Average  
of Vote2       
-0.092*** -0.006 -0.008 
       
(-8.52) (-1.20) (-1.57) 
Industry-Country Average  
of Excess1         
0.001 
         
(0.07) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
-0.101 -0.215 
 
-1.067 -2.569*** 
 
0.02 0.031 
  
(-0.63) (-1.28) 
 
(-1.57) (-4.04) 
 
(0.33) (0.52) 
Lag Leverage 
 
-1.401* -1.236 
 
-3.146 0.345 
 
-0.258 -0.234 
  
(-1.68) (-1.49) 
 
(-0.62) (0.07) 
 
(-0.63) (-0.57) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
-0.584 -0.595 
 
1.265 0.922 
 
0.367* 0.373* 
  
(-1.52) (-1.54) 
 
(0.86) (0.62) 
 
(1.76) (1.79) 
Lag Capital Expenditure 
 
-2.174 -2.397 
 
17.15 19.07 
 
-1.918 -1.882 
  
(-1.01) (-1.12) 
 
(1.37) (1.50) 
 
(-1.50) (-1.47) 
Lag Inventory§ 
 
0.852*** 0.860*** 
 
0.466*** 0.462*** 
 
0.895*** 0.895*** 
  
(38.48) (39.70) 
 
(3.31) (3.26) 
 
(124.27) (124.29) 
Constant -1.67 0.944 2.707 11.446* 30.169*** 41.541*** 14.964*** 1.700 2.988* 
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(-0.51) (0.41) (1.13) (1.67) (3.18) (4.18) (4.66) (1.03) (1.77) 
Observations 765 679 679 158 147 147 4703 4025 4025 
R-squared 0.492 0.864 0.863 0.651 0.728 0.724 0.164 0.834 0.834 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between the change in voting rights of the second largest shareholder and Operation Management. Model (1)-
(3) are the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. Model (4)-(6) are the subsample period from 2008-2010. Model (7)-(9) are the full sample 
with the industry-country average change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder as the test variable.§: In Model (1) to (3) lag 
Inventory is lagged one period of Inventory, while in Model (4) to (6) lag Inventory is the change of Inventory  from 1996 to 2008. T-statistics are 
included in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 12 
Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Dividends Payout Ratio 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES payoutratio payoutratio payoutratio payoutratio payoutratio payoutratio payoutratio payoutratio payoutratio 
Vote1 0.000 0.001 
 
0.002 0.003* 
    
 
(0.36) (1.01) 
 
(1.18) (1.78) 
    
Vote2 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
   
 
(3.62) (1.84) (2.05) (3.40) (3.09) (3.47) 
   
Excess1
  
0.001 
  
0.007*** 
   
   
(0.96) 
  
(4.57) 
   
Industry-Country 
Average of Vote1       
-0.002*** -0.001 
 
       
(-3.20) (-1.51) 
 
Industry-Country 
Average of Vote2       
0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
       
(6.52) (1.38) (1.04) 
Industry-Country 
Average of Excess1         
-0.000 
         
(-0.22) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
0.023** 0.024** 
 
0.02 0.033* 
 
0.013*** 0.013*** 
  
(2.58) (2.55) 
 
(0.94) (1.80) 
 
(5.27) (5.38) 
Lag Leverage 
 
-0.140*** -0.137*** 
 
-0.13 0.001 
 
-0.198*** -0.197*** 
  
(-2.89) (-2.83) 
 
(-0.84) (0.01) 
 
(-11.51) (-11.39) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
0.009 0.008 
 
-0.006 -0.007 
 
0.001 0.001 
  
(0.39) (0.37) 
 
(-0.13) (-0.17) 
 
(0.14) (0.16) 
Lag Capital 
Expenditure  
0.08 0.073 
 
0.632 0.35 
 
0.091* 0.093* 
  
(0.64) (0.58) 
 
(1.62) (0.96) 
 
(1.71) (1.75) 
Lag Payoutratio§ 
 
0.394*** 0.395*** 
 
0.517*** 0.511*** 
 
0.457*** 0.458*** 
  
(11.09) (11.15) 
 
(8.74) (9.23) 
 
(33.57) (33.67) 
Constant 0.387*** -0.084 -0.209* -0.243 -0.347 -0.702** 0.227*** -0.176** -0.198** 
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(5.38) (-0.65) (-1.67) (-1.01) (-1.19) (-2.45) (3.29) (-2.11) (-2.37) 
Observations 852 754 754 170 161 161 5206 4430 4430 
R-squared 0.281 0.442 0.442 0.503 0.713 0.749 0.113 0.356 0.355 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between the change in voting rights of the second largest shareholder and Dividends Payout Ratio. Model (1)-(3) are 
the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. Model (4)-(6) are the subsample period from 2008-2010. Model (7)-(9) are the full sample with the 
industry-country average change of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder as the test variable.§: In Model (1) to (3) lag Dividends Payout 
Ratio is lagged one period of Dividends Payout Ratio, while in Model (4) to (6) lag Dividends Payout Ratio is the change of Dividends Payout Ratio 
from 1996 to 2008. T-statistics are included in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 13 
 Industry-Country Average of ∆Vote2 with the Sample of Firms that Exist in Both 1996 and 2008 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA ROA ROE ROE ROE 
                    
Industry-Country 
Average of ∆Vote1 
-0.000 -0.000 
 
0.009 -0.004 
 
-0.001 -0.025 
 
 
(-0.31) (-0.06) 
 
(0.66) (-0.30) 
 
(-0.07) (-1.38) 
 
Industry-Country 
Average of ∆Vote2 
0.007*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.052*** 0.030*** 0.031** 0.078*** 0.037** 0.036** 
 
(4.24) (1.70) (2.12) (4.20) (2.64) (2.57) (4.63) (2.28) (2.24) 
Industry-Country 
Average of Excess1   
0.003** 
  
0.024 
  
0.025 
   
(2.11) 
  
(1.00) 
  
(0.77) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
-0.010 -0.008 
 
-0.293** -0.280** 
 
-0.303* -0.289* 
  
(-1.23) (-1.24) 
 
(-2.28) (-2.38) 
 
(-1.92) (-1.82) 
Lag Leverage 
 
0.025 0.035 
 
-3.138*** -3.024*** 
 
-5.297*** -5.057*** 
  
(0.36) (0.77) 
 
(-2.60) (-3.46) 
 
(-4.43) (-4.22) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
-0.017 -0.018 
 
0.178 0.169 
 
0.053 0.052 
  
(-0.73) (-0.92) 
 
(0.44) (0.47) 
 
(0.11) (0.11) 
Lag Capital 
Expenditure  
0.008 0.017 
 
0.894 0.998 
 
1.650 2.004 
  
(0.05) (0.14) 
 
(0.34) (0.45) 
 
(0.55) (0.67) 
Lag Tobin's Q 
 
0.744*** 0.741*** 
      
  
(24.82) (49.02) 
      
Lag ROA 
    
0.375*** 0.375*** 
   
     
(9.21) (17.12) 
   
Lag ROE 
       
0.402*** 0.402*** 
        
(18.26) (18.28) 
Constant 1.299*** 0.039 0.156 3.862** 4.798 4.319 0.699 4.417 3.487 
 
(9.97) (0.40) (1.17) (2.00) (1.51) (1.50) (0.21) (1.14) (0.89) 
Observations 2,279 2,034 2,034 2,269 2,042 2,042 2,281 2,038 2,038 
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R-squared 0.211 0.654 0.655 0.168 0.319 0.320 0.136 0.318 0.317 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between Industry-Country Average of Change in Voting Power of Second Large Shareholder and Tobin’s Q, 
ROA, and ROE. We are using the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. Model (1)-(3) are testing the relationship between Industry-Country 
Average of Change in Voting Power of Second Large Shareholder and Tobin’s Q; Model (4)-(6) are testing for ROA; Model (7)-(9) are testing 
for ROE. T-statistics are included in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
 
8
2
 
Table 13 (Continued) 
 Industry-Country Average of ∆Vote2 with the Sample of Firms that Exist in Both 1996 and 2008 
 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES Sdebt Sdebt Sdebt Ldebt Ldebt Ldebt 
       
Industry-Country Average of ∆Vote1 0.002*** 0.001 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
 
 
(2.66) (1.09) 
 
(-0.45) (-0.01) 
 
Industry-Country Average of ∆Vote2 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001** 
 
(-1.73) (-1.49) (-1.71) (2.90) (1.93) (2.01) 
Industry-Country Average of Excess1 
  
-0.001 
  
0.001 
   
(-0.63) 
  
(0.56) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
-0.018*** -0.019*** 
 
0.017*** 0.017*** 
  
(-4.02) (-4.03) 
 
(3.73) (3.76) 
Lag Leverage 
 
-0.097*** -0.100*** 
 
0.094*** 0.096*** 
  
(-2.94) (-3.02) 
 
(2.85) (2.90) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
0.014 0.015 
 
-0.012 -0.013 
  
(1.06) (1.09) 
 
(-0.91) (-0.94) 
Lag Capital Expenditure 
 
-0.214*** -0.220*** 
 
0.208** 0.209** 
  
(-2.61) (-2.70) 
 
(2.55) (2.57) 
Lag Short term debt 
 
0.616*** 0.618*** 
   
  
(32.80) (32.93) 
   
Lag Long term debt 
    
0.632*** 0.632*** 
     
(34.80) (34.79) 
Constant 0.633*** 0.621*** 0.637*** 0.349*** -0.203** -0.217** 
 
(6.10) (5.60) (5.70) (3.32) (-2.03) (-2.11) 
Observations 2,068 1,841 1,841 2,120 1,893 1,893 
R-squared 0.202 0.543 0.543 0.205 0.553 0.553 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between Industry-Country Average of Change in Voting Power of Second Large Shareholder and capital 
structure. We are using the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. Model (10)-(12) are testing the relationship between Industry-Country 
Average of Change in Voting Power of Second Large Shareholder and Long term debt; Model (13)-(15) are testing for Short term debt. T-statistics 
are included in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 13 (Continued) 
 Industry-Country Average of ∆Vote2 with the Sample of Firms that Exist in Both 1996 and 2008 
 
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
VARIABLES payoutratio payoutratio payoutratio inventory inventory inventory 
       
Industry-Country Average of ∆Vote1 0.000 -0.000 
 
-0.031 0.003 
 
 
(0.88) (-0.23) 
 
(-1.27) (0.28) 
 
Industry-Country Average of ∆Vote2 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.119*** -0.012 -0.012 
 
(3.05) (0.59) (0.64) (-5.91) (-1.37) (-1.34) 
Industry-Country Average of Excess1 
  
0.001 
  
0.008 
   
(1.10) 
  
(0.44) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
0.007* 0.008** 
 
0.014 0.018 
  
(1.94) (2.05) 
 
(0.16) (0.20) 
Lag Leverage 
 
-0.173*** -0.170*** 
 
0.282 0.299 
  
(-6.27) (-6.13) 
 
(0.46) (0.49) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.196 -0.201 
  
(-0.09) (-0.12) 
 
(-0.75) (-0.77) 
Lag Capital Expenditure 
 
-0.011 -0.008 
 
-1.329 -1.338 
  
(-0.16) (-0.11) 
 
(-0.85) (-0.85) 
Lag Payoutratio 
 
0.476*** 0.476*** 
   
  
(23.94) (23.92) 
   
Lag Inventory 
    
0.913*** 0.914*** 
     
(91.91) (91.87) 
Constant 0.144** -0.135 -0.151 2.427 1.338 3.379* 
 
(2.15) (-1.43) (-1.60) (0.64) (0.76) (1.96) 
Observations 2,299 2,052 2,052 2,019 1,800 1,800 
R-squared 0.154 0.386 0.386 0.249 0.876 0.876 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between Industry-Country Average of Change in Voting Power of Second Large Shareholder and Dividends 
payout ratio and Operation management. We are using the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. Model (16)-(18) are testing the relationship 
between Industry-Country Average of Change in Voting Power of Second Large Shareholder and Dividends payout ratio; Model (19)-(21) are 
testing for Inventory. T-statistics are included in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 14 
Change of Relative Power as the Test Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA ROE ROE 
Change of Relative 
Power 
0.297*** 0.070 3.075*** 1.932** 4.820*** 2.875*** 
 
(3.91) (1.45) (3.71) (2.45) (4.29) (2.65) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.464* 
 
-0.528 
  
(-1.14) 
 
(-1.71) 
 
(-1.48) 
Lag Leverage 
 
0.209* 
 
-1.359 
 
-2.893 
  
(1.70) 
 
(-0.56) 
 
(-1.32) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
-0.016 
 
0.832 
 
0.828 
  
(-0.46) 
 
(0.98) 
 
(0.84) 
Lag Capital 
Expenditure  
-0.431* 
 
-1.780 
 
-1.883 
  
(-1.81) 
 
(-0.41) 
 
(-0.34) 
Lag Tobin’s Q 
 
0.765*** 
    
  
(18.31) 
    
Lag ROA 
   
0.405*** 
  
    
(5.78) 
  
Lag ROE 
     
0.414*** 
      
(11.47) 
Constant 1.430*** 0.193 8.014*** 8.928** 10.863*** 10.829** 
 
(11.60) (1.01) (4.66) (2.30) (4.70) (2.07) 
Observations 849 751 839 750 846 749 
R-squared 0.358 0.742 0.279 0.416 0.254 0.413 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between the Change of Relative Power of the Second Large Shareholder and Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE. We 
are using the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. We require that there should be at least one large shareholder with voting rights of no 
smaller than 10% in 2008. Model (1)-(2) are testing the relationship between Change of Relative Power of the Second Large Shareholder and 
Tobin’s Q; Model (3)-(4) are testing for ROA; Model (5)-(6) are testing for ROE. T-statistics are included in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.  
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 Table 14 (Continued) 
Change of Relative Power as the Test Variable 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES Sdebt Sdebt Ldebt Ldebt Payoutratio Payoutratio Inventory Inventory 
Change of Relative Power -0.040 -0.036 0.096** 0.059* 0.104*** 0.037 -5.075*** -0.792* 
 
(-1.01) (-1.02) (2.57) (1.72) (4.02) (1.50) (-6.47) (-1.80) 
Lag Firm Size 
 
-0.022* 
 
0.018 
 
0.015* 
 
-0.080 
  
(-1.82) 
 
(1.53) 
 
(1.79) 
 
(-0.56) 
Lag Leverage 
 
-0.006 
 
0.027 
 
-0.136*** 
 
-1.260 
  
(-0.09) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(-2.80) 
 
(-1.51) 
Lag Sales Growth 
 
-0.014 
 
0.019 
 
0.008 
 
-0.590 
  
(-0.48) 
 
(0.64) 
 
(0.36) 
 
(-1.53) 
Lag Capital Expenditure 
 
-0.071 
 
0.057 
 
0.057 
 
-2.121 
  
(-0.47) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(-0.99) 
Lag Short term debt 
 
0.546*** 
      
  
(15.21) 
      
Lag Long term debt 
   
0.544*** 
    
    
(15.43) 
    
Lag Payoutratio 
     
0.401*** 
  
      
(11.35) 
  
Lag Inventory 
       
0.866*** 
        
(40.76) 
Constant 0.542*** 0.559*** 0.483*** -0.048 0.272*** -0.065 18.677*** 4.875** 
 
(7.98) (3.19) (7.17) (-0.28) (5.03) (-0.55) (11.51) (2.24) 
Observations 715 638 736 658 852 754 765 679 
R-squared 0.324 0.529 0.356 0.545 0.281 0.439 0.460 0.863 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The table presents the relationship between the Change of Relative Power of the Second Large Shareholder and capital structure, dividends payout 
ratio and operation management. We are using the whole sample period from 1996 to 2010. We require that there should be at least one large 
shareholder with voting rights of no smaller than 10% in 2008. Model (7)-(8) are testing the relationship between Change of Relative Power of the 
Second Large Shareholder and Short term debt; Model (9)-(10) are testing for Long term debt; Model (11)-(12) are testing for Payout ratio; Model 
(13)-(14) are testing for Inventory. T-statistics are included in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
